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DUE PROCESS BEHIND BARS-THE INTRINSIC APPROACH
INTRODUCTION
In the movies of George Raft and James Cagney, prisoners rattled tin cups
against the iron bars of their cells to attract the attention of their keepers.
Unfortunately, this procedure may have to be revived for prisoners to be
heard in the wake of the Supreme Court's decision in Greenholtz v. Inmates of
Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex.I In Greenholtz, the Court held
that parole release hearings do not necessarily have to meet due process
standards, 2 despite previous holdings that guaranteed due process protection
for prisoners in revocation and disciplinary hearings.3 The decision represents
the most recent cutback of the individual's due process rights4 in the general
area of new property entitlements, which extend due process "beyond the
. . . common law core" of protected property and liberty interests, s and a
retrenchment in the specific area of prisoners' rights.
6
1. 442 U.s. 1 (1979).
2. Id. at 7, 12.
3. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) (disciplinary hearings); Gagnon v. Scarpeli,
411 U.S. 778 (1973) (probation revocation hearings); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972)
(parole revocation hearings).
4. "No person shall... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.
." U.S. Const. amend. V. "No State shall... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law .. " U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
5. L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 10-9, at 519 (1978); see, e.g., Board of Curators v.
Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 86 n.3 (1978) (administrative hearing unnecessary to dismiss medical
student for academic deficiency); Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 855-56
(1977) (approving limited procedural requirements before removal of a foster child from foster
parents); Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 113 (1977) (summary suspension or revocation of drivers'
licenses is constitutional if objective standard is shown); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 680
(1977) (no need for prior hearing in public school to impose disciplinary corporal punishment);
Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 344-45 (1976) (public employment may be terminated at will
according to statute without a prior hearing); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 711-12 (1976)
(individuals have only a limited property interest in their reputation); Mitchell v. W.T. Grant
Co., 416 U.S. 600, 616-18 (1974) (limited procedural rights in attachment hearings); Board of
Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 578 (1972) (untenured professor at a state university had no
property interest in his continued employment). But see Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v.
Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1978) (customers of a municipal utility must 6e accorded procedural due
process rights before termination of service). See generally L. Tribe, supra, §§ 10-10 to -11 (1978);
The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 95-114 (1976).
6. See, e.g., Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 87 (1976) (entitlement to a parole revocation
hearing arises only after execution of a parole violation warrant, even if parolee is incarcerated
for the commission of a crime); Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 242-43 (1976) (unless created
by state law, prisoner has no liberty interest in remaining in the same prison in which he was
originally confined); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 223-24 (1976) (same); Baxter v. Pal-
migiano, 425 U.S. 308, 314-15 (1976) (inmate involved in a disciplinary hearing for an offense
that is also a crime has no right to counsel or cross-examination during the prison proceeding).
One commentator has alleged a correlation between the Supreme Court's pro-prisoners' rights
stance of the early seventies and the 1971 Attica uprising, in which the inmate takeover of a
prison yard resulted in the death of thirty-nine men. B. Fein, Significant Decisions of the
Supreme Court 1973-74 Term 43 (1975). The Court's zeal to protect prisoners' rights seems to have
declined conjunctively with the memory of the Attica tragedy.
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Due process preserves the enjoyment of personal freedom and private
ownership by delineating the constitutional limitations on arbitrary govern-
ment actions. 7 The determination of a prisoner's right to such protection
involves a two-pronged inquiry-whether due process protection applies to
the particular individual, 9 and, if so, what procedure must be granted. ' 0 The
application question depends on the existence of a liberty or property interest
in the threatened benefit or opportunity." The procedure inquiry focuses on
the traditional criteria used to identify the process due any constitutionally
based right. 1 2
The two-pronged inquiry in Greenholtz resulted in a narrow confinement of
the procedural due process rights of prisoners seeking parole release. The
Court held that clue process protection for potential parolees is not constitu-
tionally mandated; rather, it must be explicitly provided for in the specific
statute that created the parole system. 13 The constitutional criterion to be
used in determining if any process is due is the minimization of the risk of an
erroneous decision. 14 Because the Court has consistently held that due process
is a flexible concept,' 5 any procedure that lessens the risk of error is constitu-
tionally sound. 16
The Greenholtz rationale allows government to control both prongs of the
due process inquiry--creation of a liberty interest and establishment of the
procedure to be followed. As applied to the prisoner, "he [becomes] little more
than [a] slave."' For example, if no statutory standards exist to govern
7. See Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 106 (1908); P. Freund, A. Sutherland, M.
Howe & E. Brown, Constitutional Law 994 (4th ed. 1977); L. Tribe, supra note 5, § 10-7, at 501.
8. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-58 (1974): Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,
483-85 (1972); Note, Specifying the Procedures Required by Due Process: Toward Limits on the
Use of Interest Balancing, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1510, 1510 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Interest
Balancing]; see Rabin, Job Security and Due Process: Monitoring Administrative Discretion
Through a Reasons Requirement, 44 U. Chi. L. Rev. 60, 76-77 (1976).
9. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979); Wolff
v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556-57 (1974); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
10. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1979);
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558-59 (1974); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 484 (1972).
11. L. Tribe, supra note 5, § 10-12, at 533; see Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970).
12. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 151-58 (1974) (plurality opinion); Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U.S. 254, 267-68 (1970); L. Tribe, supra note 5, § 10-12, at 533.
13. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 12 (1979).
14. Id. at 12-13; see Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
15. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 560 (1974); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481
(1972); Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961);
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162-63 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring). In McElroy, the Court noted that "[t]he very nature of due process negates any
concept of inflexible procedures universally applicable to every imaginable situation." 367 U.S. at
895.
16. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 13 (1979).
17. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 233 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting). In the nineteenth
century, and into the twentieth, prisoners were viewed as being totally without rights and were
used as slave labor by state prisons. See Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. 790, 796 (1871); T.
Wicker, A Time to Die 60-61 (1975). This view has been discredited by the application of the
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interprison transfer, prisoners may be subject to transfer at the unrestricted
discretion of prison officials.' 8 Furthermore, a classification system that
controls prisoner access to beneficial work-release and furlough programs can
operate free from procedural requirements that protect inmates from mistaken
designations. '9
This Comment proposes a unified approach to defining procedural due
process rights for prisoners so that individual dignity may be protected.
Although it may appear that this position would accord greater constitutional
guarantees to prisoners responsible for their own incarceration than to
citizens who have responsibly maintained their freedom, the need to protect
prisoners' rights is justified by the paternalism inherent in the prison system.20
Part I discusses the theories underlying the determination of entitlement to
due process protection and will advocate the application of the intrinsic
approach. Part II applies these theories to specific factual instances and
establishes the benefits of the intrinsic, approach. Part III contains an exam-
ination of the criteria necessary to determine the procedural prong of the
inquiry, followed by a testing of specific procedures in Part IV.
I. INMATE ENTITLEMENT
Due process generally protects traditional interests such as the ownership of
real and personal property, 2' and freedom from arbitrary practices in the
criminal justice system. 22 An entitlement, however, is a property or liberty
interest derived from the relationship between the government and the
individual 23 that extends beyond the scope of these customary concerns. 2' Not
to be found in the Constitution, entitlements are originated in and shaped by
independent sources, such as state and federal statutes, or the mutual conduct
eighth amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment to the states, Robinson v.
California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962); Morales v. Schmidt, 489 F.2d 1335, 1338 (7th Cir. 1973),
modified, 494 F.2d 85 (7th Cir. 1974) (en banc), and by the influence of the organized labor
movement. T. Wicker, supra, at 61.
18. See, e.g., Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 242-43 (1976); Meachum v. Fano, 427
U.S. 215, 228 (1976).
19. See, e.g., Makris v. United States Bureau of Prisons, 606 F.2d 575, 576 (5th Cir 1979)
(per curiam); Solomon v. Benson, 563 F.2d 339, 342 (7th Cir. 1977).
20. See Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225, 237 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc) (Burger. J.), cert. denied, 375
U.S. 957 (1963); Rust v. State, 582 P.2d 134 (Alaska 1978).
21. See, e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 81 (1972) (procedural due process is mandated
in replevin proceedings involving state action); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256. 261 (1946)
(government infliction of servitude on private property constitutes a taking entitling the owners to
due process protection); Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 279 (1928) (state statute allowing the
destruction of private property to preserve property of greater public value complied with due
process and was constitutional under the fourteenth amendment).
22. See, e.g., Duncan v. Luisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) (state defendants are entitled to
jury trials for serious offenses); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (evidence from an illegal
search and seizure cannot be used against a state defendant); Rochin v. California, 342 U-S. 165,
172 (1952) (physical invasion of the defendant's body violated due process).
23. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 n.8 (1970); Reich, The New Property, 73 Yale L.J.
733, 733 (1964).
24. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571-72 (1972).
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and comprehension of government and citizen. 25 Such interests merit protec-
tion because individuals are totally reliant on the government as the sole
source of entitlements. 26 In recognition of this dependence, the Supreme
Court has placed entitlement interests within the safeguard and custody of the
due process clauses. 27
The grant of due process protection for entitlement interests has eliminated
imbalances inherent in the relationship between government and individuals
that arise from government's dominant posture. 28 The right/privilege distinc-
tion, a derivative from monarchical times, is the major evil discredited. 29
Although a right was always entitled to due process protection, a privilege
could be revoked without such protection because it was granted by govern-
ment largesse. 30 The Supreme Court has vehemently rejected this distinc-
tion. 3' Outmoded and outdated, the distinction, like its source, is no longer
useful. The complex and expansive concepts of liberty and property cannot be
neatly pigeonholed, 32 and the Court's rejection of the right/privilege distinc-
tion represents a recognition of this reality.
The right/privilege distinction had a two-pronged analysis for an interest
described as a privilege. 33 The recognition of the new property entitlements
25. Id. at 577.
26. Reich, supra note 23, at 737.
27. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 576 (1975) (attendance at a public high school);
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 571-72 (1974) (prisoners' good time credit); Arnett v.
Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 151-52 (1974) (plurality opinion) (federal employment under the Lloyd-
LaFollette Act); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973) (probation); Perry v. Sindermann,
408 U.S. 593, 601-02 (1972) (government employment under a series of one year contracts);
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972) (parole revocation); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535,
540 (1971) (possession of a driver's license); Goldberg v Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264-65 (1970)
(welfare payments).
28. See Reich, supra note 23, at 749.
29. See Rummel v. Estelle, 587 F.2d 651, 667 (5th Cir 1978) (Clark, C. J., dissenting), qff'd,
48 U.S.L.W. 4261 (U S. Mar. 18, 1980) (No. 78-6386). This is especially true of parole, which,
until recently, was considered "an act of grace, comparable to the pardoning power that was once
the prerogative of the monarchy." J. Mitford, Kind and Usual Punishment 218 (1973).
30. Reich, supra note 23, at 740; see Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490, 492-93 (1935) (probation),
31. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 (1972); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,
482 (1972); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374 (1971); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539
(1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970).
32. " 'Liberty' and 'property' are broad and majestic terms. They are among the '[g]reat
[constitutional] concepts ... purposely left to gather meaning from experience.... [T]hey relate
to the whole domain of social and economic fact, and the statesmen who founded this Nation
knew too well that only a stagnant society remains unchanged.' " Board of Regents v. Roth, 408
U.S. 564, 571 (1972) (quoting National Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Co., 337 U.S. 582, 646 (1949)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
33. See Reich, supra note 23, at .740. The first prong was the gratuity principle, which
pronounced that the government could "withhold, grant, or revoke the largesse at its pleasure."
Id. (footnote omitted). The procedural prong gave the government free rein in defining the terms
and conditions of any grant of largesse. Id. The only check on the free-wielding government
power to grant privileges was the requirement that government obey its own rules, See Escoe v.
Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490, 493 (1935); cf. Finley v. Staton, 542 F.2d 250 (5th Cir. 1976) (sex offender
barred from access to work-release programs was denied due process when correctional board
failed to follow its own rules for deciding access).
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destroyed the need for such reasoning because an entitlement encompasses
what was formerly denominated either a right or a privilege. 34 Nevertheless,
a slight vestige of the right/privilege analysis presently remains. Although the
government is not constitutionally mandated to bestow largesse on the
citizenry, promoted grants and opportunities may not be withdrawn unless
the government complies with procedural due process. 3S Rights granted
prisoners, formerly characterized as privileges, 36 fall into the category of the
new liberty interests. 3" The first prong of the entitlement due process analysis
becomes how, if at all, has government exercised its largesse.
A. Theories Available to Prisoners to Attain Due Process Protection
1. Conditional Liberty Theory
An individual's present enjoyment of conditional liberty has been recog-
nized as an entitlement, sufficient to trigger due process protection. 38 Condi-
tional liberty has been defined as freedom subject to restrictions, the violation
of which may result in termination of the granted freedom. 39 Although liberty
is conditional, there is a sufficient retention of "core values of unqualified
liberty, '40 whereby termination of the conditional freedom would cause the
individual to be "condemned to suffer grievous loss," 4' such as reincarceration
after enjoying the benefits of a new job and reunion with one's family. 42
Grievous loss is a touchstone concept in determining whether procedural due
process safeguards are deserved. 43 Its application is visible in both core and
new property situations.
4
34. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971).
35. See Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967); L. Tribe, supra note 5, § 10-9. at 516-17.
36. See Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490, 492 (1935).
37. Compare Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973) (probation is an entitlement
protected by due process) with Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490, 492 (1935) (probation is a privilege
granted by government largesse).
38. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481-82
(1972).
39. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 478-79 (1972). Acknowledgement of conditional
liberty theory buries the concept of "constructive custody," in which the parolee, although outside
prison walls, was still serving his sentence, and therefore, reincarceration was considered merely
a continuation of that custody. J. Mitford, supra note 29, at 219; A. von Hirsch & K. Hanrahan,
The Question of Parole 53 (1979).
40. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972). The core liberty interests were described
in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923): "Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from
bodily restraint but also the right of the individual . . . generally to enjoy those privileges long
recognized ... as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men." Id. at 399. See also
Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 722-23 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Board of Regents v. Roth,
408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972). See generally L. Tribe, supra note 5, § 10-8.
41. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring); cf. S. 10, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1 (1979) (proposing the intervention of the Attorney
General to protect the rights of all institutionalized persons if state action causes "grievous harm"
to the enjoyment of those rights).
42. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972).
43. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974); Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114,
123-24 (1889).
44. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v
McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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Conditional liberty theory was developed in cases in which the asserted
interest was presently enjoyed, for example, when a parolee was freed from
confinement. 45 Several circuit courts extended due process protection to the
prospective enjoyment of conditional liberty in parole release situations by
asserting that the prisoner's liberty interest in his right to be considered for
parole46 is equivalent to the parolee's interest in remaining outside the prison
walls. 47 Eligibility for parole subtly, yet significantly, changes the nature of
the inmate's incarceration. A negative decision by a parole board, therefore,
subjects a prisoner to continued restrictions on his liberty that are greater than
the conditional restrictions of parole. 48 For example, a grievous loss may arise
from the lost opportunity to enjoy the benefits of conditional liberty when a
parole board is inattentive to data that would favorably influence the parole
decision. 49 An adverse decision returns to a locked cell both the parolee
subject to revocation and the prisoner subject to parole denial; the variation
lies only in the method of reimprisonment. The difference in the grievous loss
inherent in termination of either a prospective or present enjoyment is
therefore only a matter of degree. The Supreme Court has noted that "to
determine whether due process requirements apply in the first place, we must
look not to the 'weight' but to the nature of the interest at stake.""0 The
natures of prospective and present enjoyment-conditional liberty-are identi-
cal, while the weights-lost opportunity as opposed to lost benefit-differ.
Due process protection should therefore apply in both cases.
Some courts, however, have refuted the equivalence position.51 They hold
45. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 779-80 (1973); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,
472-73 (1972).
46. Christopher v. United States Bd. of Parole, 589 F.2d 924, 927 n.8 (7th Cir. 1978);
Franklin v. Shields, 569 F.2d 784, 788 n.4 (4th Cir. 1977), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 569 F.2d
800 (4th Cir.) (en banc) (per curiam), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1003 (1978). The right to be
considered stems from statutorily-set dates that require a parole board to consider a prisoner for
release. See, e.g., Alaska Stat. § 33.15.080 (Supp. 1980) (prisoner is eligible for parole after
serving one-third of the sentenced period of confinement); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 31-411,
41-1604.06 (Supp. 1979) (classification system determines eligibility, although passing through the
system mandates release); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 17-1-204 (1973) (eligibility arises at the expiration of
the inmate's minimum term as set by the sentencing court or by statute); Fla. Stat. Ann.
§ 947.16(1) (West Supp. 1978) (dates of eligibility are related to the committed offenses); N.Y. Exec.
Law § 259-i (2)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1979) (eligibility arises one month before end of minimum term,
and if parole is denied, a new date for eligibility must be set within two years).
47. Williams v. Ward, 556 F.2d 1143, 1159 (2d Cir.i, cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 944 (1977);
United States ex rel. Richerson v. Wolff, 525 F.2d 797, 799 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425
U.S. 914 (1976); Childs v. United States Bd. of Parole, 511 F.2d 1270, 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1974);
United States ex rel. Johnson v. Chairman of N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, 500 F.2d 925 (2d Cir.),
vacated as moot sub nom. Regan v. Johnson, 419 U.S. 1015 (1974), overruled, Boothe v.
Hammock, 605 F.2d 661, 664 (2d Cir. 1979) (citing Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal &
Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1 (1979)).
48. Childs v. United States Bd. of Parole, 511 F.2d 1270, 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
49. Bradford v. Weinstein, 519 F.2d 728, 732 (4th Cir. 1974), vacated as moot, 423 U S. 147
(1975) (per curiam).
50. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570-71 (1972) (emphasis in original).
51. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1979)
(distinguishing parole release from parole revocation); Johnson v. Wells, 566 F.2d 1016, 1018 (5th
[Vol. 481072
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that no grievous loss is suffered by a prisoner from an adverse result in a
parole hearing because there is no material change in the inmate's status, as
he remains subject to the original terms and conditions of incarceration. 52
Therefore, they do not equate the nature of the inmate's interest in a parole
hearing with the parolee's interest in a revocation hearing. The nonequiva-
lence view limits due process protection to "safeguard[ing] the security of
interests that a person has already acquired in specific benefits."5 3 Because the
prisoner has not acquired the benefits of conditional liberty, the lost opportu-
nity to do so is no more than an "abstract need or desire . . . a unilateral
expectation. ' - 4 Under this analysis, due process protection cannot attach be-
cause the prisoner subject to a parole release hearing holds only a prospective
liberty interest.
In Greenholtz, the Court attempted to resolve the clash between these two
positions.55 Unfortunately, the resolution expressly limited conditional liberty
theory to present enjoyment.-6 The decision fails to account for previous due
Cir. 1978) (expectancy of parole release is not a constitutionally protected liberty or property
interest); Craft v. Texas Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 550 F.2d 1054, 1056 (5th Cir.) (same), crt.
denied, 434 U.S. 926 (1977); Cruz v. Skelton, 543 F.2d 86, 89 (5th Cir. 1976) (unlike parole
revocation, denial of parole is not a grievous loss meriting procedural due process protection),
cert. denied, 433 U.S. 911 (1977); Brown v. Lundgren, 528 F.2d 1050, 1052-53 (5th Cir.) (same),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 917 (1976); Sexton v. Wise, 494 F.2d 1176, 1178 (5th Cir. 1974) (rescission
of parole granted before inmate was released from custody did not require compliance with
constitutional safeguards mandated in parole revocation proceedings); Scarpa v. United States
Bd. of Parole, 477 F.2d 278, 282 (5th Cir.) (en banc) (distinguishing parole release from parole
revocation), vacated and remanded to consider mootness, 414 U.S. 809 (1973).
52. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 9 (1979);
Brown v. Lundgren, 528 F.2d 1050, 1052-53 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 917 (1976); accord,
Farries v. United States Bd. of Parole, 484 F.2d 948, 949 (7th Cir. 1973); Menechino v. Oswald,
430 F.2d 403, 408 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1023 (1971).
53. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576 (1972).
54. Id. at 577; see United States ex rel. Bey v. Connecticut State Bd. of Parole, 443 F.2d
1079, 1086 (2d Cir.), vacated and remanded with direction to dismiss as moot, 404 U.S. 879
(1971); Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing", 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1267, 1296 (1975).
55. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 6 (1979).
56. The Nebraska inmates claimed that they had been unconstitutionally denied parole
because procedural due process was lacking. Id. at 3-4. The prisoners were only eligible for
discretionary parole, in which a full consideration of the risk of release may be deferred. Id. at 4.
The discretionary parole investigation was divided into initial and final stages. The initial stage
consisted of a review of records and an interview with the prisoner at which he could support his
argument for release. An adverse decision at this stage mandated a statement of reasons pointing
out the weaknesses in the inmate's position. Id. at 4-5. If the board decided to proceed to the final
stage, notice was given by informing the inmate only of the month of the hearing; each inmate
was required to check a bulletin board daily to see if his hearing was scheduled for that day. At
the full hearing, the prisoner was allowed to present evidence and witnesses in his behalf, as well
as to have the presence of counsel and a complete record of the proceeding. Cross-examination of
adverse witnesses, however, was not permitted. Denial of parole at this stage also warranted a
prompt statement of reasons. Id. at 5. The initial stage was challenged as constitutionally
inadequate because the prisoners argued that they possessed both a conditional liberty interest
and a protectible statutory interest in a parole release hearing that entitled prisoners in the initial
stage to the same procedures accorded inmates in the final stage. Id. at 5-6. The Supreme Court's
review of the granted procedures was based on statutory entitlement, id. at 12, because the
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process analysis under which the Court did not distinguish between the new
applicant and the current possessor when entitlement was created by the
satisfaction of statutory eligibility standards.57 If the inmate is eligible for
parole,58 he should enjoy the benefits of due process protection despite the
discretion inherent in parole board decisions.5 9 After Greenholtz, however,
the potential parolee cannot rely on conditional liberty theory to secure due
process protection.
2. Statutory Due Process Theory
The present theory of statutory due process, in the area of prisoners' rights,
is derived mainly from the rationale of Woff v. McDonnell.60 A Nebraska
statute created a system whereby the prisoner could earn "good time credits"
and could be deprived of them only upon proof of serious misconduct. 6 1 The
Supreme Court held that the state's own recognition that deprivation was a
sanction that altered the terms of imprisonment caused due process protection
to apply to the state-created liberty interest. 62 Unlike conditional liberty
theory, which emphasizes the nature of the grant of largesse, statutory due
process theory shifts the emphasis to the method of the grant. Both govern-
extension of conditional liberty entitlement to potential possessors was rejected as too tenuous. Id.
at 10-11. The Court further found the procedures to be adequate because they maintained a
reasonable accuracy, id. at 14-15, and did not cast the proceeding in an adversarial framework.
Id. at 15-16.
57. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970) (eligibility for welfare payments);
Willner v. Committee on Character & Fitness, 373 U.S. 96, 102 (1963) (admission to the bar);
Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 524-25 (1958) (right to tax exemption); Goldsmith v. United
States Bd. of Tax Appeals, 270 U.S. 117, 123 (1926) (right of CPA to practice before the board);
Friendly, supra note 54, at 1304."
58. Parole is characterized as discretionary when the parole board may alone determine
whether a prisoner will be released. A parole board's power to parole may be derived from a
statute that explicitly describes the board's power as discretionary. E.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §
54-125 (West Supp. 1980); N.Y. Exec. Law § 259-i (2)(c) (McKinney Supp. 1979). Other statutes
use language such as may release, Alaska Stat. § 33.15.080 (Supp. 1979); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 31-412 (1976), or shall not release unless. Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 38, §§ 1003-3-5(c)-(e) (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1979). These statutes have certain criteria to channel the power of discretion. In Illinois,
the prisoner may be released if it is determined that he will successfully remain at liberty, and
that the release would not create disrespect for the law or a disruption of prison discipline. Id.
Arizona employs a more relaxed standard, which inquires into mere success if released. Ariz.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 31-412 (1976). Despite the criteria used, the prisoner who successfully meets
those conditions is not guaranteed his freedom because the board's power is discretionary.
Mandatory parole, however, guarantees the freedom of a successful prisoner. The parole board's
power to release is limited by statutory language such as shall release. Cal. Penal Code §§ 3041(a)-(b)
(WestSupp. 1980); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 947.16(3)(WestSupp. 1978). Whilemandatoryparolestatutesalso
employ certain criteria to determine whether an inmate should be released, id., the parole board that
determines that the criteria have been successfully met must release the qualified prisoner.
59. See Bradford v Weinstein, 519 F.2d 728, 732 (4th Cir. 1974), vacated as moot, 423 U.S.
147 (1975).
60. 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
61. Id. at 546-47.
62. Id. at 557.
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ment creation of the right and recognition of the grievous loss caused by its
deprivation 63 must exist for statutory due process protection to attach.
An expansive interpretation of this theory defines the two conditions
broadly, requiring either an explicit 64 or implicit 65 creation of the right,
coupled with a governmental realization of the legitimate expectations that
have been engendered. 66 Under this view, due process protection logically
applies to parole release hearings because the parole system, although not
constitutionally mandated, 67 is deliberately created by government to promote
an inmate's attainment of liberty, as well as to further the traditional penal
goal of rehabilitation. 68 The system's operation creates a legitimate entitle-
ment because the frequency with which parole is granted indicates gov-
ernmental recognition that deprivation is a serious sanction. 69
63. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 710-11 (1976). See also Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215
(1976). In Paul, Justice Brennan noted that "the content of 'liberty' in those [due process] Clauses
[of the fifth and fourteenth amendments] has never been thought to depend on recognition of an
interest by the State or Federal Government." 424 U.S. at 722 n.10 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
64. An explicit creation of entitlement is rooted in statute or other sources of rules and
regulations. E.g., Drayton v. McCall, 584 F.2d 1208 (2d Cir. 1978); In re Davis, 25 Cal. 3d 384,
599 P.2d 690, 158 Cal. Rptr. 384 (1979). In Drayton, the Second Circuit held that a person
granted parole had a reasonable expectation of liberty because of the regulatory structure of the
Federal Parole Commission. 584 F.2d at 1215. In Davis, rules promulgated by the California
Director of the Department of Corrections gave the petitioners a liberty interest in not being
segregated for disciplinary reasons without due process protection. 25 Cal. 3d at 390-91, 599 P.2d
at 695, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 389.
65. An implied creation of entitlement ;tems from the particular conduct and understanding
between the individual and government, as well as from policy rationales underlying broad
statutory powers. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471
(1972). In Perry, a teacher in a state college had a legitimate claim of entitlement to job tenure,
even though no explicitly created tenure system existed. The entitlement stemmed from the
practice of the particular university. 408 U.S. at 602. In Morrissey, the parolee's entitlement to
conditional liberty was partly based on an "implicit promise" between the parties that revocation
of parole would occur only upon violation of the specified conditions. 408 U.S. at 482. See also
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 578 & n.16 (1972) (university teacher had only an
abstract interest in being rehired, not a protected property interest rooted in statute or policy).
66. Williams v. Missouri Bd. of Probation & Parole, 585 F.2d 922, 924 (8th Cir. 1978),
vacated and remanded, 442 U.S. 926 (1979).
67. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1. 7 (1979); see
Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976); J. Palmer, Constitutional Rights of Prisoners § 9.2, at
127 (2d ed. 1977). The Supreme Court stated in Meachunt that "given a valid conviction, the
criminal defendant has been constitutionally deprived of his liberty." 427 U.S. at 224.
68. Williams v. Missouri Bd. of Probation & Parole, 585 F.2d 922, 923 (8th Cir. 1978),
vacated and remanded, 442 U.S. 926 (1979); Franklin v. Shields, 569 F.2d 784, 788-89 (4th Cir.
1977), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 569 F.2d 800 (4th Cir.) (en banc) (per curiam), cert. denied,
435 U.S. 1003 (1978).
69. The pervasive effect of parole on the prison system is obvious. More than half of the
inmates in the United States are released on parole before the expiration of their sentenced term.
Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 30 n.10 (1979)
(Marshall, J., dissenting in part); Morris & Hawkins, Rehabilitation: Rhetoric and Reality, in
Probation, Parole, and Community Corrections 26, 35 (2d ed. IL Carter & L. Wilkins eds.
1976). There is, however, a wide disparity in the parole systems of the individual states. For
example, 70% of the inmates in New York State are released in their first appearance before the
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The Supreme Court, however, often takes a positivist view of statutory
entitlements, which requires specific statutory authority to invoke due process
protection.7 0 This position is acutely reflected in prisoners' rights cases. 7 1
Unless the relevant statute creates an entitlement, no protectible interest will
be found.7 2 Despite the dependence on semantics of this narrow approach,
rather than on tile understandings or expectations that are fostered, 73 the
Court has adopted the positivist view with respect to parole hearings. Each
parole statute must specifically create an entitlement for due process protec-
tion to apply.
74
As implemented by the Supreme Court, the positivist view is merely a
mutation of the right/privilege distinction, a revival in the guise of new
parole board. C. Silberman, Criminal Violence, Criminal Justice 296 (1978). In California, over
90% of prisoners are paroled. J. Mitford, supra note 29, at 217. Maine, however, has abolished
parole. 1975 Me. Laws ch. 500, § 71 (repealing Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 34, §§ 1671-1679). In
June, 1979, the Governor or Texas granted parole to only 21% of the inmates who the state parole
board recommended for release. Rummel v. Estelle, 48 U.S.L.W. 4261, 4269 (U.S. Mar. 18,
1980) (No. 78-6386) (Powell, J., dissenting). This statistical data convinced the Greenholtz
minority that the creation of a parole system was sufficient to entitle prisoners to due process
protection. "[W]hen a State adopts a parole system that apprles general standards of eligibility,
prisoners justifiably expect that parole will be granted fairly and according to law whenever those
standards are met." 442 U.S. at 19 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Recently, the Second Circuit reiterated its rejected view that prisoners have a legitimate
expectation of release because of the frequency of parole grants, thereby implicitly criticizing the
Greenholtz majority. Pugliese v. Nelson, Nos. 79-2136, -2138, -2140, slip op. at 1608 (2d Cir.
Mar. 4, 1980); cf. Dumschat v. Board of Pardons, Nos. 78-2124, -2125, slip op. at 1967-68 (2d
Cir. Mar. 20, 1980) (frequency with which Connecticut Board of Pardons granted pardons
created a reasonable expectation, rooted in state practice, for prisoners to be accorded due process
protection).
70. L. Tribe, supra note 5, § 10-7, at 506; Rabin, supra note 8, at 80; see, e.g., Bishop v.
Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 344 (1976) (entitlement to municipal employment can be determined by city
ordinance); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 711-12 (19761 (state law does not protect present
enjoyment of reputation that has been damaged by government action).
71. Calhoun, The Supreme Court and The Constitutional Rights of Prisoners: A Reappraisal,
4 Hastings Const. L.Q. 219, 230 (1977); Comment, Two Views of a Prisoner's Right to Due
Process: Meachum v. Fano, 12 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 405, 431 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
Two Views]; see, e.g., Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1,
12 (1979) (parole statute created a justifiable expectation of release); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S.
215, 226 (1976) (state law does not create the right for a prisoner to remain in his initially assigned
prison).
72. See Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 12 (1979).
73. See note 65 supra.
74. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 12 (1979).
Subsequent lower court decisions have denied due process protection for potential parolees solely
on the Greenholtz rationale. See, e.g., Bowles v. Tennant, 613 F.2d 776 (9th Cir. 1980); Sharp v.
Leonard, 611 F.2d 136 (6th Cir. 1979) (per curiam); Wagner v. Gilligan, 609 F.2d 866 (6th Cir.
1979) (per curiam); Boothe v. Hammock, 605 F.2d 661 (2d Cir. 1979); Shirley v. Chestnut, 603
F.2d 805 (10th Cir. 1979); Austin v. Armstrong, 473 F. Supp. 1114 (D. Nev. 1979); Campbell v.
Montana State Bd. of Pardons, 470 F. Supp. 1301 (D. Mont. 1979); accord, Shahid v. Crawford,
599 F.2d 666, 670 n.5 (5th Cir. 1979); Cicero v. Olgiati, 473 F. Supp. 653 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
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property entitlement analysis. 7s A new property privilege is seen as a grant of
largesse; government has not recognized deprivation of the privilege as a
sanction because of the privilege's implicit nature in the policies and conduct
underlying the statute's implementation. 76 The rejected two-pronged inquiry
of privileges 77 has been revived because the Court has treated state law as
dispositive in establishing that some property interests are not entitled to due
process protection. 78 For example, in Meachum v. Fano,7 9 the source of
entitlement could have been either state law or prison practice, 80 but because
the Massachusetts statute gave prison officials totally discretionary powers of
transfer, a statutorily based entitlement could not exist. 8' Furthermore, the
prison practice of transfer for only serious misconduct did not create an
entitlement because the same statutory authorization allowed transfer for
other reasons.8 2 The Court focused on the potential exercise of power, rather
than on the actual exercise of power.83 The Meachum opinion demonstrates
the Court's reluctance to find an entitlement in state practice or policy, 84
although the Court's own precedent points in the opposite direction."5 As a
result, the application inquiry becomes "riot a question of which label.., one
attaches to the status of the [property or liberty] interest, but of who does the
labeling. ",86
The rebirth of the right/privilege distinction has had a deleterious effect on
prisoners. Becduse the Supreme Court has "[left] to the state the identification
of protectible liberty and property interests, prisoners have, for all practical
purposes, no due process guarantees beyond those the state affords them.
87
The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, which preserves privileges inex-
tricably bound to protectible rights,8 8 has effectively been used to circumvent
75. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 353-54 n.4 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ('the Court's
approach is a resurrection of the discredited rightslprivileges distinction, for a State may now
avoid all due process safeguards attendant upon the loss of even the necessities of life .. merely
by labeling them as not constituting 'property' "); see L. Tribe, supra note 5, § 10-10, at 524;
Comment, Entitlement, Enjoyment, and Due Process of Law, 1974 Duke L.J. 89. 98-99.
76. See note 30 supra and accompanying text; see, e.g., Meachum v. Fano, 427 US. 215, 228
(1976) (government has unfettered discretion to transfer prisoners); Eskridge v. Casson, 471 F.
Supp. 98, 101 (D. Del. 1979) (government has unfettered discretion to deny parole).
77. See notes 33-35 supra and accompanying text.
78. Rabin, supra note 8, at 69 n.37.
79. 427 U.S. 215 (1976).
80. Id. at 216.
81. Id. at 226-27.
82. Id. at 228.
83. Id. at 235 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 242 (1976).
84. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 216, 228 (1976); Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 344
(1976); see Rabin, supra note 8, at 69-70; cf. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S.
816, 845-46 (1977) (Court applied statutory law to determine the entitlement of foster parents and
their foster child, rather than precedent normally governing family life).
85. See note 65 supra.
86. Rabin, supra note 8, at 72 (footnote omitted).
87. Calhoun, supra note 71, at 233 (footnote omitted).
88. Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81
Harv. L. Rev. 1439, 1445-49 (1968). The doctrine can be defined as "whatever an express
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the original right/privilege distinction. This doctrine, however, is useless to
the prisoner in obtaining due process protection because his liberty interest
has no basis in the Constitution. The prisoner is left with the Court's
approach, which is "too obscure to serve the purposes of protecting reliance
on government, reducing helplessness, or enhancing accountability. "8 9
B. A Suggested Alternative-The Intrinsic Theory of Due Process
Because of the limitations placed on the conditional liberty and statutory
due process theories, which leave the prisoner at the mercy of government, a
new approach is necessary to ensure due process protection for a prisoner
when a grievous loss is suffered. The intrinsic approach to due process
resolves this problem by "[granting] to the individuals or groups against
whom government decisions operate the chance to participate in the processes
by which those decisions are made, an opportunity that expresses their dignity
as persons." 90 Even within the controlled environment of a prison, each
inmate retains his basic human dignity to assist his reattainment of a status in
life worthy of respect. 9 1 Inmates cannot be seriously or arbitrarily deprived of
this inherent quality because they are no longer considered "slave[s]" of the
state. 92 The protection afforded the inmate can be evidenced by the "re-
constitutional provision forbids government to do directly it equally forbids government to do
indirectly." Id. at 1445-46. In Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583
(1926), California withheld the privilege of public highway use, thereby subverting the right of
the private carrier not to be converted into a common carrier. The Supreme Court accorded
constitutional protection to the privilege by safeguarding the right. Id. at 592-94. Prisoners,
however, do not have a liberty interest conditioned on a constitutional right to parole, see note 67
supra and accompanying text; the doctrine, therefore, is an impotent weapon for the potential
parolee.
89. L. Tribe, supra note 5, § 10-10, at 525 (footnote omitted); see, e.g., Rummel v. Estelle, 48
U.S.L.W. 4261 (U.S. Mar. 18, 1980) (No. 78-6386). In Rummel, the Supreme Court upheld the
mandatory life sentence of a Texas felon whose crimes had netted him less than $250. The Court
found that this sentence was not "cruel and unusual punishment" under the eighth amendment
because the possibility of parole made it unlikely that he would serve the full term. Id. at 4265. In
light of the Court's holding in Greenholtz, this analysis becomes "cruelly ironic." Id. at 4269
(Powell, J., dissenting). Because the Texas inmate has neither a conditional liberty interest nor a
statutory entitlement, Craft v. Texas Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 550 F.2d 1054, 1056 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 926 (1977), the possibility of parole is no more than a "mere hope."
Although the Court is willing to find this hope sufficient to defeat the inmate's eighth amendment
claim, this hope is held insufficient to support his claim to due process protection. 48 U.S.L.W. at
4269 (Powell, J., dissenting).
90. L. Tribe, supra note 5, § 10-7, at 502 (footnote omitted); see Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565,
583-84 (1975); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264-65 (1970); Finney v. Arkansas Bd. of
Correction, 505 F.2d 194, 208 (8th Cir. 1974); Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process
Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Matthews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a
Theory of Value, 44 U. Chi. L. Rev. 28, 50 (1976). The instrumental approach must be
distinguished from the intrinsic approach; in the former, due process requirements are seen as
"means of assuring that society's agreed-upon rules of conduct, and its rules for distributing
various benefits, are in fact accurately and consistently followed." L. Tribe, supra note 5, § 10-7,
at 503.
91. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 234 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting); cf. Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264-65 (1970) (welfare recipients).
92. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 233 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see note 17 supra
and accompanying text.
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siduum of constitutionally protected rights" 93 that the inmate retains despite
the partial deprivation of his liberty. 94 With the assertion of personal dignity
as the primary aim, due process becomes a means to achieve more than mere
procedural accuracy and an end in itself.95 Because the government has the
power to change the status of the individual, the method used to effect change
is important.9 6 Procedural due process can be used to preserve the quality of
the prisoner's status, thereby moderating the adverse change that may result
from government action.
Two difficulties arise from the application of the intrinsic approach. Argu-
ably, it is an extreme departure from the present position of state deference;
nevertheless, the dominant posture of government over the lives of inmates
makes it a necessity. 97 Second, the emphasis on personal dignity makes the
intrinsic approach a "purely subjective standard of procedural due process."' 8
Because personal dignity is manifested in the particular individual, the
intrinsic approach needs an objective standard to judge whether a deprivation
is serious or arbitrary. Inside prison walls, the necessary qualifying factor
exists in a right to rehabilitation. 9 9 A grievous loss would be defined as any
93. United States ex rel. Miller v. Twomey, 479 F.2d 701, 712 (7th Cir. 1973); see Meachum
v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225 (1976); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974). The
Supreme Court has steadfastly protected basic constitutional rights asserted by prisoners. See,
e.g., Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405-06 (1974) (freedom of speech); Cruz v. Beto, 405
U.S. 319, 321-22 (1972) (free exercise of religion); Younger v. Gilmore, 404 U.S. 15, 15 (1971)
(per curiam) (access to the courts); Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333, 333-34 (1968) (per curiam)
(equal protection).
94. Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 244-45 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Meachum v.
Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 229-30 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting); United States ex ret. Miller v.
Twomey, 479 F.2d 701, 712 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1146 (1974); Watson v.
Whyte, - W. Va. , -, 245 S.E.2d 916, 918 (1978).
95. L. Tribe, supra note 5, § 10-10, at 525. Conversely, the instrumental approach merely
implements existing rules of law. Id. § 10-7, at 503.
96. See Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 234 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
97. Prison is "a human environment from which there is no escape and over which the inmate
has no control." C. Silberman, supra note 69, at 378.
98. Mashaw, supra note 90, at 50.
99. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 234 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting). A "right to
rehabilitation" has yet to be specifically stated by the courts. S. Rep. No. 96-416, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. 13 (1979) [hereinafter cited as S. Rep. No. 96-416]; D. Rudovsky, A. Bronstein & E. Koren,
The Rights of Prisoners 89-91 (1977); Rothman, Decarcerating Prisoners and Patients, 1 Civ.
Lib. Rev. 8, 21-22 (Fall 1973). Nevertheless, a "right to treatment" has been recognized for
patients who have been civilly committed in state institutions. Bowring v. Godwin, 551 F.2d 44,
48 n.3 (4th Cir. 1977); Welsch v. Likins, 550 F.2d 1122, 1125, 1126 n.6 (8th Cir. 1977); Scott v.
Plante, 532 F.2d 939, 947 (3d Cir. 1976); Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305, 1312-13 (Sth Cir.
1974); Eckerhart v. Hensley, 475 F. Supp. 908, 914 (W.D. Mo. 1979). But see O'Connor v.
Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 573 (1975) (Court refused to decide whether civilly committed persons
had a "right to treatment"). The permissible reasons for civil commitment are the dangers posed
by the patient, either to the community or to himself, and the need of the patient for treatment
and care. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d at 1312. The state's unquestioned power to confine people
to state medical institutions stems from its police power, when the action is taken to protect the
community, or from the state's role as parens patriae. when acting to treat the patient- The state
is exercising both functions when commitment is based on self-imposed danger. Donaldson v.
O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507, 520-21 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated and remanded, 422 U.S. 563 (1975);
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deprivation of a liberty interest that detracts from the prisoner's dignity by
seriously damaging the rehabilitative process.
Rehabilitation has become the expressed goal of the contemporary prison
system,' 0 0 and the "cornerstone of probation and parole."''° Although the
Eckerhart v. Hensley, 475 F. Supp. at 913 n.l1. If treatment is the cause of civil commitment,
denial of access to adequate care violates due process. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d at 1312. If the
justifications are the protection of society and of the individual patient, treatment is the "quid pro
quo" that society provides for infringing the liberty interests of the civilly institutionalized. Id.
The justifications for criminal commitment parallel the rationales for civil commitment. The
theories underlying the existence of the prison system are deterrence, restraint, retribution, and
rehabilitation. See W. LaFave & A. Scott, Handbook on Criminal Law § 5, at 21-25 (1972). The
deterrence factor justifies criminal commitment by the discouragement of the individual through
punishment, and of the general population through the threat of punishment. H. Hart,
Punishment and Responsibility 5, 22 (1968); W. LaFave & A. Scott, supra, § 5, at 22, 23.
Deterrence alone, however, may breed hatred in the individual prisoner; its effect as a control on
the general population is questionable. Id. Restraint merely isolates the prisoner from society,
which has labelled him as harmful. Id. at 22. Restraint unaccompanied by beneficial programs is
dangerous because most prisoners will eventually re-enter society. Id. The sole purpose of
retribution is to punish the individual for the commission of an offense; allegedly, this will foster
respect for the laws of society. This theory, however, has generally been discredited as a sole
basis for criminal confinement. H. Hart, supra, at 1, 8; W. La Fave & A. Scott, supra, § 5, at 24.
Conversely, rehabilitation attempts to effect a beneficial change in the incarcerated individual so
that he may better fit into society. H. Hart, supra, at 26; W. LaFave & A. Scott, supra, § 5, at
23. Although each of these theories provides a permissible basis for criminal confinement,
rehabilitation should be the prime function of incarceration; the other reasons then become more
palatable. Rehabilitation mutes the deleterious effects of deterrence, disarms the dangerousness of
restraint, and ameliorates the indefensibility of retribution. W. LaFave & A. Scott, suspra, § 5, at
22-24. The first three policies for criminal commitment can be condensed into the societal
protection rationale of civil commitment. Thus, a modified version of the "quid pro quo" rule of
due process entitles the prisoner to rehabilitative programs. See Rust v. State, 582 P.2d 134, 140
(Alaska 1978). If the inmate is imprisoned to protect society as an exercise of the police power,
treatment is what society offers to enable the individual to regain his liberty. If rehabilitation is
recognized as the primary purpose of incarceration, denial of access to programs that will help the
prisoner to recapture a proper place in society violates due process because government acts as
parens patriae for the prisoner and for the institutionalized patient. See Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d
225, 237 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc) (Burger, J.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 957 (1963). The striking
similarities in the conditions of all confined persons reasonably justify the existence of a "right of
rehabilitation." Further development of the "right to treatment" entitlement theory springs from
the total dependence of the patient on the government for any opportunity of cure. Eckerhart v.
Hensley, 475 F. Supp. at 914. The prisoner is also totally dependent on the institution for
improvement through announced rehabilitative programs. If the prisoner is denied access to these
programs by state action, he becomes a victim of the dangerous idleness inherent in prison life,
and is unable to appeal to the outside world for similar help. See S. Rep. No. 96-416, supra, at
19; T. Wicker, supra note 17, at 61.
100. E. Wright, The Politics of Punishment 152-54 (1973); see Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb.
Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 13 (1979). Rehabilitation is the expressed goal of some
state parole boards. See, e.g., Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 57, § 7 app. (West Supp. 1979-80) (main
purpose of the Oklahoma parole board is to reclaim and rehabilitate offenders); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit.
61, § 331.1 (Purdon 1964) (Pennsylvannia's public policy as to parole is to assist and facilitate
rehabilitation).
101. H. Abadinsky, Probation and Parole: Theory and Practice 12 (1977); see Morrissey v.
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goal has been denounced as unrealistic, unworkable, and nonexistent,10 2 the
theory remains the underlying premise for official prison practices and state
statutes.10 3 Prisoners' assertions of constitutional rights based on a depriva-
tion of a liberty interest must be evaluated in light of this prominent penal
objective.10 4  Several courts, in ordering changes in the conditions of
confinement, have found certain prison practices to be disruptive factors in
rehabilitation. 0 5 "The absence of an affirmative program of. . .rehabilita-
tion may have constitutional significance where in the absence of such a
program conditions and practices exist which actually militate against reform
and rehabilitation. 10 6 By denying due process protection, courts may sanc-
tion arbitrary action by prison officials that makes rehabilitation difficult to
achieve. 10 7 The intrinsic approach thus provides a proper balance between
the interests of inmates and government because both have a stake in
rehabilitation.10 8 The prisoners are accorded due process protection for any
grievous loss, while government, the grantor of the largesse, retains a voice in
the definition of loss, although the ability to abuse that power is removed. The
government is bound by its own words when it demonstrates respect for
individual dignity by expressing the rehabilitative goal. By refusing or ne-
glecting to adopt due process requirements, the prison system undermines its
own strategy, and rehabilitation often becomes a self-defeating exercise.
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 477 (1972); Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248 (1949); F Cohen,
The Legal Challenge to Corrections: Implications for Manpower and Training 29 (1969). See also
J. Mitford, supra note 29, at 218.
102. H. Abadinsky, supra note 101, at 169; C. Silberman, supra note 69, at 416-17;
Kastenmeier & Eglit, Parole Release Decision Making: Rehabilitation, Expertise and the Demise
of Mythology, 22 Am. U. L. Rev. 477 (1973).
103. See note 100 supra.
104. See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822-23 (1974).
105. See, e.g., Barnett v. Rodgers, 410 F.2d 995, 1002 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (inmates' religious
beliefs are more important than prison dietary regulations); Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 580
(8th Cir. 1968) (whipping of inmates is counterproductive to the goal of rehabilitation because of
the hatred bred toward prison authorities); Carothers v. Follette, 314 F. Supp 1014, 1025
(S.D.N.Y. 1970) (letter writing privileges protected because they did not inhibit the rehabilitative
process). See also Novak v. Beto, 453 F.2d 661, 675 (5th Cir. 1971) (Tuttle, C.J., dissenting) (use
of isolation cells should be discontinued because of adverse effect on rehabilitation), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 968 (1972); S. Rep. No. 96-416, supra note 99, at 12-14.
106. Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 379 (E.D. Ark. 1970), aff'd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir.
1971).
107. See Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318, 328 (M.D. Ala. 1976), aff'd and remanded sub
nom. Newman v. State, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'd in part and remanded sub nom.
Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978) (per curiam). See generally D. Rudovsky, A. Bronstein &
E. Koren, supra note 99, at 91.
108. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 785 (1973); Williams v. Missouri Bd. of Probation &
Parole, 585 F.2d 922, 924 (8th Cir. 1978), vacated and remanded, 442 U.S. 926 (1979); Zurak v
Regan, 550 F.2d 86, 95 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 914 (1977); Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225,
237 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc) (Burger, J.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 957 (1963). The mutuality of interest
is inherent in government's desire neither to release a potential danger to the community nor to
incarcerate an inmate beyond the point of rehabilitation. The prisoner also wants to be freed and,
once released, to survive adequately in the outside world.
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II. THE APPROPRIATENESS OF THE INTRINSIC APPROACH IN
SPECIFIC SITUATIONS
The use of the intrinsic approach depends on context, and it is therefore
unlikely to reflect a methodology of factual ad hoc analysis. 109 The context of
any prisoners' rights decision is the nature of the governmental deprivation
involved, as weighed against the mutual goal of rehabilitation, rather than a
narrow focus on statutory authorizations or grants of power. For example, the
present application of due process protection in parole hearings is dependent
on the wording of the individual state statutes." 0 This approach, with its
semantic base, will grant some parolees more due process protection than
others. Yet the nature and purpose of parole remains the same despite the
wording of any statute. The intrinsic approach would analyze the concept of
parole hearings through the underlying rehabilitative rationale, thereby pro-
viding every prisoner eligible for parole with exactly the same due process
protection.
Thus, while expanding the scope of due process application to encompass
more than present enjoyment or statutory rights, the focus of the entitlement
prong is narrowed to determining whether the inmate's grievous loss of a
liberty interest retards rehabilitation. It is therefore necessary to establish a
factual unity among three specific situations-discipline, release, and
revocation-to determine how each fits within the rehabilitative mold so that
the intrinsic approach can be uniformly applied.
A. Discipline
Discipline is an integral part of the rehabilitative process; it is not imposed
for the pavlovian inducement of respect for society and good manners, but to
maintain control within the prison. a1' Such control is necessary to create the
proper and most effective atmosphere for rehabilitation,112 and therefore,
109. L. Tribe, supra note 5, § 10-13, at 539.
110. See note 61 supra and accompanying text. State parole statutes vary greatly. See, e.g.,
Cal. Penal Code §§ 3041(a)-(b) (West Supp. 1980) (California parole board shall set a release date
on which a prisoner becomes eligible for parole); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 54-125 (West Supp.
1980) (granting of parole is totally within the discretion of the Connecticut parole board); Il. Ann.
Stat. ch. 38, §§ 1003-3-5(c)-(e) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979) (Illinois parole board shall not release a
prisoner if it decides that the release would be a bad risk, cause disrespect for the law, or disrupt
institutional discipline; if a prisoner has served his maximum term less good time credit, however,
he shall be released); Ind. Code Ann. § 11-1-1-9 (Burns Supp. 1979) (parole shall be granted only
if the inmate satisfies certain criteria established both by statute and by the Indiana parole board);
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 83-1,114 (1976) (Nebraska prisoners shall be granted parole unless a valid
statutory objection can be found); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 57, §§ 332, 332.7 (West 1969) (although
the governor of Oklahoma has the sole power to parole, the board, which makes the recommen-
dations of release, has the duty to examine the potential parolee after he has served one third of
his sentence); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 61, § 331.21 (Purdon Supp. 1979-80) (Pennsylvania board of
parole has complete discretion in the granting of parole to eligible inmates).
111. H. Hoffman, Prisoners' Rights--Treatment of Prisoners and Post-Conviction Remedies
3-4 (1976).
112. "There can be no hope of reform, no chance of making prisons more decent and
humane, unless order is restored. . . . [W]ork release programs, home furloughs . . . vocational
training... are useless if inmates live in constant fear of being raped or 'piped.' Court guarantees
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discipline is part of the intrinsic approach's context analysis. Judicial applica-
tion of due process in prison settings, however, has been attacked as subver-
sive of prison discipline. 13 It has been argued that granting any procedure to
uphold an inmate's rights implies that prison officials are fallible. ' 4 Any
vindication of prisoners' rights shifts the balance of prison power and provides
a clarion call for rebellion. 1 5 The extremism of this view of due process is
apparent when it is noted that inmates do not shed their constitutional
protections when they enter prison.1 1 6 Prison disciplinary proceedings must
therefore be based on the "mutual accommodation between institutional needs
and objectives" and basic constitutional rights. "1 7 Basic liberty interests arise
in four situations that should be analyzed under the intrinsic approach.
1. Work-Release Programs
Work-release is a statutorily created program""s in which a measure of
freedom is granted to the prisoner. He is allowed to participate in
community-based activities, such as employment and education, while still
serving his sentence. 1' 9 Work-release programs, clearly rehabilitative in na-
ture,' 20 are one alternative to the traditional concept of incarceration.1
2
'
Disciplinary revocation of participation in work-release programs has been
identified as a grievous loss meriting due process protection. ' 2 2 One authority
has suggested that the protection stems from conditional liberty theory
because the nature of both work-release and parole revocation have similar
impacts on rehabilitation, although the degree of loss varies. 23 Federal
of due process are irrelevant if inmates ask to be placed in segregation for their own protection"
C. Silberman, supra note 69, at 416-17.
113. Id. at 406-07. The prison guards function as the first line of discipline in the prison
hierarchy; they are supposed to control the inmate community. Informal bargains are often used
to quiet the prison community, rather than strict enforcement of rules. Id. at 398-99.
114. Id. at 406.
115. Id. at 407.
116. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974); see note 95 supra and accompanyNing
text.
117. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974).
118. ABA Comm'n on Correctional Facilities & Services, & Council of State Gov'ts, Com-
pendium of Model Correctional Legislation and Standards X-180-81 (2d ed. 1975) [hereinafter
cited as Compendium]. Forty-eight states and the federal government have work-release statutes
only Utah and Wyoming lack statutory authorization, although both operate such programs. Id.
119. Zalba, Work-Release-A Two-Pronged Effort, in Corrections: Problems and Prospects
257 (D. Petersen & C. Thomas eds. 1975); see Durso v. Rowe, 579 F.2d 1365 (7th Cir 1978),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1121 (1979).
120. National Advisory Comm'n on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, Corrections,
Standard 2.9, at 43 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Corrections]; Zalba, supra note 119, at 265.
121. C. Silberman, supra note 69, at 373.
122. See, e.g., Durso v. Rowe, 579 F.2d 1365, 1371 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
1121 (1979); Tracy v. Salamack, 440 F. Supp. 930, 934 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd, 572 F.2d 393 (2d
Cir. 1978); Crafton v. Luttrell, 378 F. Supp. 521, 535 (M.D. Tenn. 1974); Schumate v New
York, 373 F. Supp. 1166, 1169 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
123. Corrections, supra note 120, at 548. See also Durso v. Rowe. 579 F.2d 1365, 1371 (7th
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1121 (1979); Tracy v. Salamack, 440 F. Supp. 930, 934
(S.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd, 572 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1978).
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courts, however, have adopted the expansive view of statutory due process,
and have found entitlement in official prison policies, practices, and regula-
tions. 1 24 In Tracy v. Salamack, 125 the government contended that participa-
tion in a work-release program was terminable at will because of the language
of the applicable New York statute and of the form agreement that governed
participation in the program. 126 The district court, however, rejected the
positivist approach 127 in holding that entitlement is grounded in prison policy
and practice because a reasonable expectation of entitlement must be based on
the knowledge of the prisoner, not on a statute of which he is ignorant.1 28
Furthermore, the language of the form agreement must be read in the context
of existing prison practice, which militates against frivolous terminations of
participation. 129
The intrinsic approach to due process would reach the same conclusion.
Revocation of participation is a grievous loss of a liberty interest because
arbitrary removal from a rehabilitative program would defeat its primary
purpose. Even if removal is warranted, the lack of due process causes a
second rehabilitative failure because the prisoner does not always understand
the relationship between his conduct and the removal and may become
confused as to how to guide his future behavior.' 30 By providing procedural
due process for a disciplinary action, 13 1 prison officials can ameliorate any
failures within the program and increase its effectiveness. Procedural due
process becomes a component of the rehabilitative process.'3 2
2. Good Time Credit
Forfeiture of good time credit 13 3 is a common disciplinary action taken by
prison officials to punish flagrant or serious misconduct. In Wolff v. McDon-
nell, 134 the Supreme Court held this forfeiture to be a grievous loss deserving of
due process protection. 135 The existence of the good time system provides an
124. Winsett v. McGinnes, No. 74-210, slip op. at 17 (2d Cir. Mar. 24, 1980) (en banc);
Durso v. Rowe, 579 F.2d 1365, 1369 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1121 (1979); Tracy v.
Salamack, 440 F. Supp. 930, 935 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd, 572 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1978); cf. Walker
v. Hughes, 558 F.2d 1247 (6th Cir. 1977) (disciplinary hearings).
125. 440 F. Supp. 930 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd, 572 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1978).
126. Id. at 934.
127. See notes 70-75 supra and accompanying text.
128. 440 F. Supp. at 935.
129. Id.
130. See H. Hoffman, supra note 111, at 3-2.
131. See National Sheriffs' Ass'n, Standards for Inmates' Legal Rights § 8, in Compendium,
supra note 118, at IV-63.
132. See, e.g., Barrows v. Hogan, 379 F. Supp. 314, .316 (M.D. Pa. 1974) (assault of officer);
Downes v. Norton, 360 F. Supp. 1151, 1154 (D. Conn. 1973) (escape).
133. Good time credit may be defined as a reduction in the term of confinement because of the
inmate's general good behavior and restraint from committing specific rule infractions. A. von
Hirsch & K. Hanrahan, supra note 39, at 43; see Note, Procedural Due Process in Parole Release
Proceedings-Existing Rules, Recent Court Decisions, and Experience in the Prison, 60 Minn.
L. Rev. 341, 344 n. 14 (1976).
134. 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
135. See id. at 558.
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incentive for the prisoner to control his behavior. 136 Revocation alters the terms
and conditions of confinement, thereby adversely affecting the rehabilitative
process. 1 37 The lower courts, in determining entitlement, have focused on the
existence of the system that creates a reasonable expectation of the shorter term
of imprisonment that has been earned, rather than on the specific statutory
language. 1 38 These decisions are a further rejection of the positivist view of due
process. 1
39
A disciplinary board exercises discretion when it makes a factual determi-
nation that a prisoner has committed an act of serious misconduct. The
standard for punishment is deliberately kept vague to facilitate the efficiency
of the prison's operations. 140 For example, escape is considered an offense for
which good time credit is automatically forfeited.' 4' Yet, if the escape
occurred while the prisoner was participating in a work-release program or
was free on furlough, mitigating circumstances might warrant a punishment
other than revocation of good time credit. ' 42 Prison authorities, however, may
tailor the punishment to the individual inmate, thereby precluding the inmate
population from anticipating the consequences of any violation. 1 3 Unclear
disciplinary standards place the inmate in a position that exposes him to the
arbitrary loss of good time credit.
The intrinsic approach would acknowledge that the creation of the good
time system is a deliberate government act to manufacture a reward for
rehabilitative progress. Any deprivation of this reward would inflict a griev-
ous loss on the prisoner because altering his expectancy of release frustrates
the rehabilitative process by further engendering tension, frustration, resent-
ment, and despair. 1 4 4 Government recognition of the gravity of the sanction is
136. See id. at 563.
137. Id. at 571 n.19; cf. Vitek v. Jones, 48 U.S.L.W. 4317, 4320 (U.S. Mar 25, 19801 tNo
78-1155) (transfer from penal institution to mental hospital alters the terms and conditions of
confinement).
138. Workman v. Mitchell, 502 F.2d 1201, 1211 (9th Cir. 1974). In Wolff v. McDonnell, 418
U.S. 539 (1974), the Supreme Court ruled that the loss of good time credits entitled prisoners to
due process protection. Although the deprivation of good time credit seriously altered the term of
confinement, id. at 547, 558-59, it was sanctioned and controlled by statute- Id at 548. 557
Judicial interpretation of Wolff has seen the key factor underlying the finding of entitlement in the
alteration of the nature of imprisonment as a result of prison discipline. See, e-g., United States
ex rel. Larkins v. Oswald, 510 F.2d 583, 584 (2d Cir. 1975) (isolation for possession of
inflammatory and revolutionary papers); Gomes v. Travisono, 510 F.2d 537, 539 (ist Cir- 1974)
(out-of-state prison transfer for a "troublemaker"). This interpretation of Wolff has been asserted
as being correct. See Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U S_ 1,
25 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting in part). The Supreme Court, however, has adopted a
positivist interpretation of Wolff, see notes 60-74 supra and accompanying text, focusing solely on
statutory language. See 442 U.S. at 12.
139. See notes 124-29 supra and accompanying text.
140. H. Hoffman, supra note 111, at 3-2.
141. Id. at 9-2 1.
142. Downes v. Norton, 360 F. Supp. 1151, 1154 (D. Conn. 1973). see Rankin v Wain-
wright, 351 F. Supp. 1306 (M.D. Fla. 1972).
143. See H. Hoffman, supra note 111, at 3-2.
144. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 562 (1974).
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implicit in the magnitude of the reward. Against this context, the revocation
of good time credit always merits due process protection even if the grant or
revocation of the reward is within the discretion of the prison authorities.145
3. Interprison Transfers
In Meachum v. Fano, 146 several inmates suspected of committing arson in
the prison were transferred from a medium security prison to a maximum
security facility. 147 The Supreme Court held that the interprison transfers did
not constitute a grievous loss that entitled the inmates to due process
protection because their convictions had sufficiently extinguished their liberty
so as to permit the state to confine them in any of its prisons. 148 The absence
of statutory recognition that transfer constitutes a grievous loss foreclosed the
finding of a liberty interest. 149 Moreover, the discretionary power of prison
officials negated any inmate expectation to remain in the medium security
prison despite the possible existence of a prison policy that permits transfers
for serious misconduct. The Court noted that transfer decisions are predictive,
based on the evidence of benefits to the institution and the "safety and welfare
of the inmate[s]. ' '15 0 The constitutional deprivation of liberty and the informed
discretion of officials combined to make the entitlement of the prisoner "too
ephemeral and insubstantial to trigger procedural due process protections.''5
In the companion case, Montanye v. Haymes, 15 2 the Court held that a transfer
between institutions of equal security did not inflict a grievous loss on an
inmate.' 53 Again, the Court emphasized the broad discretionary powers
granted by state law to the prison officials as the factor mitigating against a
finding of entitlement.- 4
Prior to Meachum and Montanye, lower courts made a variety of distinc-
tions to discern procedural due process entitlement in prison transfers.""
145. See, e.g., Alaska Stat. § 33.20.050 (1979) (revocation of good time credit is within tile
discretion of the commissioner of health and social services); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 127, § 129
(Michie/Law. Co-op 1972) (good time credit may be revoked for any violation of prison rules);
Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 800.33 (West 1968 & Supp. 1979-80) (same).
146. 427 U.S. 215 (1976).
147. Id. at 216-22.
148. Id. at 224, 228.
149. Id. at 226-27.
150. Id. at 225.
151. Id. at 228. But see Vitek v. Jones, 48 U.S.L.W. 4317 (U.S. Mar. 25, 1980) (No.
78-1155). In Vitek, the Supreme Court found that the language of the Nebraska statute allowing
involuntary transfers of prisoners to mental hopitals created a reasonable expectation to remain
in the originally assigned prison. Id. at 4320. Alternatively, the transfer to a mental institution
deprived the inmate of a liberty interest because "involuntary commitment to a mental hospital Is
not within the range of conditions of confinement to which a prison sentence subjects an
individual." Id. at 4321 (citations omitted).
152. 427 U.S. 236 (1976).
153. Id. at 242.
154. Id. at 243.
155. See, e.g., Daigle v. Hall, 387 F. Supp. 652, 659 11D. Mass. 1975) (any dire change in tile
conditions of confinement because of specific past misconduct invokes due process protection),
aff'd, 564 F.2d 884 (1st Cir. 1977); Robbins v. Kleindienst, 383 F. Supp. 239, 248 (D.D.C. 1974)
(interruption of rehabilitative programs sufficiently changes the terms of imprisonment to invoke
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After Meachum and Montanye, although some courts follow their rationales
unquestioningly, S6 others have attempted to distinguish the case by granting
protection for transfers with a plainly evident disciplinary motive.' 5 7 For
example, one district court has determined that if the initial placement of a
prisoner had to comply with due process procedures, any subsequent transfer
must do the same. 15 8
In the reality of the contemporary prison system, transfers are mainly used
for control and discipline, a procedure known as "bus therapy."' 9 The
impact of interprison transfers on prisoners is significant. Prison inmates are
thoroughly aware of the variations throughout the prison system, as reflected
in the differing severity and benefits of each institution. 160 Bus therapy may
be the most effective weapon of prison officials if, for example, a minor
infraction of the rules can have a California inmate sent from Chino, a quiet
prison, to Folsom, a violent prison. 16' Furthermore, prison officials can wield
bus therapy in retaliation against prisoners who are considered "trou-
blemakers," yet who do not violate any prison rules to merit a severe
sanction. 162 In Montanye v. Haymes, 163 a prisoner who circulated a petition
to regain access to the prison law library was transferred, two days later, from
one New York maximum security facility to another.1 64 The transfer clearly
due process protection); Jones v. Institutional Classification Comm., 374 F. Supp. 706, 710-11
(W.D. Va. 1974) (procedure preceding a prison transfer must be fair and impartial to comport
with due process requirements); Croom v. Manson, 367 F. Supp. 586, 590 tD. Conn. 1973)
(out-of-state prison transfer alters the conditions of confinement by disrupting the inmate's access
to the courts).
156. Cofone v. Manson, 594 F.2d 934, 939 (2d Cir. 1979); see Bowles v. Tennant, 613 F,2d
776, 77849 (9th Cir. 1980); Boothe v. Hammock, 605 F.2d 661, 663-64 t2d Cir. 1979).
157. Aikens v. Lash, 547 F.2d 372, 373 n.1 (7th Cir. 1976); Bruce v. Wade, 537 F.2d 850,
854 n.9 (5th Cir. 1976); Lamb v. Hutto, 467 F. Supp. 562, 566 (E.D. Va. 1979); Hardwick v.
Ault, 447 F. Supp. 116, 123 (M.D. Ga. 1978). These cases relied on the Supreme Court's refusal
to distinguish administrative transfers from disciplinary transfers. Montanye v. Haymes, 427
U.S. 236, 242-43 (1976). Their reasoning, however, seems correct in light of the recent ruling in
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979), in which the Court held that prisoners may be legitimately
subjected to restrictions and conditions of confinement, as long as the restrictions do not amount
to punishment. Although interprison transfers may be a legitimate restriction on an inmate's
liberty, a transfer coupled with segregation will be held unconstitutional. Id. at 537-39.
158. Lavine v. Wright, 423 F. Supp. 357, 361 (D. Utah 1976). See also Watson v. Whyte,
- W. Va ... -, 245 S.E.2d 916, 918 (1978).
159. J. Mitford, supra note 29, at 252; C. Silberman, supra note 69, at 397. "Bus therapy"
was one suggested solution to the unrest brewing before the Attica riot, but was rejected by
Russell G. Oswald, the New York State Commissioner of Correctional Services, as "'too
simplistic.'" T. Wicker, supra note 17, at 8.
160. M. Braly, False Starts 152 (1976). One ex-convict offered his impressions of the
California prison system: "At one end was Chino, the first of the wall-less prisons, good food,
good visits and the Man wasn't staring down your throat all day. At the other end stood Folsom,
stuffed with psychos, knife artists and other varieties of hopeless cases. Killing was unknown at
Chino, rare on the Quentin yard, but a commonplace at Folsom." Id.
161. J. Mitford, supra note 29, at 250.
162. See Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 242 (1976).
163. 427 U.S. 236 (1976).
164. Id. at 237-38.
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had a punitive motive, but the Supreme Court refused to accord due
process protection. 165
In Meachum v. Fano, 166 the positivist view of statutory due process caused
the Supreme Court to delve into the abstract to solve a concrete problem. 167
The grant of unfettered discretion can lead to the arbitrary action against
which due process protects. 168 Under the Meachum rationale and its subse-
quent interpretation, due process depends on the superficial label attached to
the action,169 rather than on its true nature. A grant of discretion must not be
allowed total freedom from the limitations imposed by due process. Generally,
when a statute allows complete discretionary action, the authorization is
construed to mean that the granted power will not be used until all the
necessary information has been gathered fairly. 170 If discretion is to be
characterized as informed,' 7 ' its exercise must comply with that procedure.
The intrinsic approach to due process would examine interprison transfers
in the context of the surrounding circumsthnces. It would recognize bus
therapy as a grievous loss which is noted by government through prison
practices that entail the proper exercise of discretion. If the welfare of the
prisoner is a consideration in making transfers, as the Meachum opinion
suggests,' 7 2 the rehabilitative process becomes the controlling, qualifying
factor in determining entitlement. 173
4. Classification
It was originally believed that the labeling of a prisoner with "special
offender" status or "central monitoring classification"'' 74 must comply with
165. Id. at 242-43.
166. 427 U.S. 215 (1976).
167. See notes 79-83 supro and accompanying text.
168. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
"'When rules are broken, discipline shall be administered . . . in such a way as to conserve
human values and dignity and to bring about desirable changes in attitude.' " J. Mitford, supra
note 29, at 252 (quoting American Correctional Ass'n, Manual of Correctional Standards).
169. The government can defeat the inmate's entitlement to due process merely by labeling a
disciplinary transfer as administrative. Two Views, supra note 71, at 430-31.
170. Williams v. Ward, 556 F.2d 1143, 1158-59 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 944
(1977); United States ex rel. Johnson v. Chairman of N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, 500 F.2d 925,
929-30 (2d Cir.), vacated as moot sub nom. Regan v. Johnso:n, 419 U.S. 1015 (1974), overruled,
Boothe v. Hammock, 605 F.2d 661, 664 (2d Cir. 1979); cf. Goldsmith v. United States Bd. of
Tax Appeals, 270 U.S. 117, 123 (1926) (discretion in an administrative proceeding).
171. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 11-13 (1979);
Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 228 (1976).
172. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225 (1976).
173. Bus therapy may be used as a reward by transferring a maximum security inmate to a
medium or minimum security facility. It may also be used as a punishment that is effectively as
severe as solitary confinement. Feelings of isolation may be fostered by destroying the prisoner's
routine, thereby hindering the rehabilitative process. Under either view, bus therapy has a
significant effect on the strategy of rehabilitation. C. Silberman, supra note 69, at 397-98. The
prisoner on whom bus therapy is frequently inflicted is likely to spend more time in prison
because of his reputation as a disciplinary problem. J. Mitford, supra note 29, at 252-53. See also
Two Views, supra note 71, at 435-37.
174. "Special Offender" status is applied to "certain special categories of offenders who
require greater case management supervision than the usual case." Bureau of Prisons, Policy
Statement No. 7900.47, at 1 (Apr. 30, 1974). The Central Monitoring System, which supersedes
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due process. 175 The classification can severely delay or preclude a prisoner's
access to work-release programs, social furloughs, release to half-way houses,
rewarding interprison transfers, and early parole. 176 Because nonclassified
prisoners have automatic access to these programs, 7 7 the system alters the
conditions of the special offender's imprisonment, thereby creating a grievous
loss. 178 Therefore, a classification system that "[p]reclu[des] . . . access to
those benefits entails [a] loss as grievous as that occasioned by their revoca-
tion, for the inmate's stake remains the same in each instance.'
17
9
In Moody v. Daggett, o80 the Supreme Court renewed its focus on statutory
due process to defeat the entitlement of a special offender. In referring to the
prisoner classification system, the Court stated that "Congress has given
federal prison officials full discretion to control these conditions of
confinement . .. and [the prisoner] has no legitimate statutory or constitu-
tional entitlement sufficient to invoke due process."1 s Because the statutory
grant of unfettered discretion to create the system is the justification for
defeating the entitlement claims of classified prisoners,' 8 2 a prison policy of
the "Special Offender" category, was created by Bureau of Prisons, Policy Statement No.
7900.53, at 1 (Apr. 7, 1976), and revised by Bureau of Prisons, Policy Statement No. 7900.53A,
at 2 (Dec. 1, 1977). The Bureau's power to create this classification system stems from 18 U.S.C.
§§ 4042(1), 4081 (1976) (Bureau of Prisons may consider all factors to ensure the proper
treatment, classification, and segregation of inmates in federal penal institutions).
175. Polizzi v. Sigler, 564 F.2d 792 (8th Cir. 1977); Holmes v. United States Bd. of Parole,
541 F.2d 1243 (7th Cir. 1976), overruled in part, Solomon v. Benson, 563 F.2d 339, 340 (7th Cir.
1977); Cardaropoli v. Norton, 523 F.2d 990 (2d Cir. 1975) (implicitly overruled in Pugliese v.
Nelson, Nos. 79-2136, -2138, -2140 (2d Cir. Mar. 4, 1980)); Raia v. Arnold, 405 F. Supp. 766
(M.D. Pa. 1975); Stassi v. Hogan, 395 F. Supp. 141 (N.D. Ga. 1975), overruled, Mayo v. Sigler,
428 F. Supp. 1343, 1350 (N.D. Ga. 1977); Catalano v. United States, 383 F. Supp. 346 (D. Conn.
1974).
176. Polizzi v. Sigler, 564 F.2d 792, 796 (8th Cir. 1977); Holmes v. United States Bd. of
Parole, 541 F.2d 1243, 1250 (7th Cir. 1976), overruled in part, Solomon v. Benson, 563 F.2d 339,
340 (7th Cir. 1977); Cardaropoli v. Norton, 523 F.2d 990, 995 (2d Cir. 1975) (implicitly overruled
in Pugliese v. Nelson, Nos. 79-2136, -2138, -2140 (2d Cir. Mar. 4, 1980)); Catalano v. United
States, 383 F. Supp. 346, 350 (D. Conn. 1974). See also Cousins v. Oliver, 369 F. Supp. 553
(E.D. Va. 1974). In Catalano, the court noted that "[t]hese amenities are eagerly solicited and
received by the inmates and obviously play a meaningful role in enhancing rehabilitation,
reducing frustration, maintaining morale, and minimizing unrest in the prison setting." 383 F.
Supp. at 351.
177. Catalano v. United States, 383 F. Supp. 346, 351 (D. Conn. 1974); 28 C.F.R. §§
523.12-.15 (1979).
178. Cardaropoli v. Norton, 523 F.2d 990, 995 (2d Cir. 1975) (implicitly overruled in Pugliese
v. Nelson, Nos. 79-2136, -2138, -2140 (2d Cir. Mar. 4, 1980)).
179. Id. at 995 n.l.
180. 429 U.S. 78 (1976).
181. Id. at 88 n.9; see 18 U.S.C. § 4081 (1976); 28 C.F.R. § 2.47 (1979).
182. Pugliese v. Nelson, Nos. 79-2136, -2138, -2140, slip op. at 1608-09 (2d Cir. Mar. 4,
1980); Makris v. United States Bureau of Prisons, 606 F.2d 575, 576 (5th Cir. 1979); Jones v.
Diamond, 594 F.2d 997, 1015 (5th Cir.), rehearing en bane granted, 602 F.2d 1243 (5th Cir.
1979); Solomon v. Benson, 563 F.2d 339, 342 (7th Cir. 1977); Marchesani v. McCune, 531 F.2d
459, 462 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 846 (1976); Smaldone v. United States, 458 F. Supp.
1000, 1004 (D. Kan. 1978); Mayo v. Sigler, 428 F. Supp. 1343, 1349-50 (N.D. Ga. 1977); cf.
Altizer v. Paderick, 569 F.2d 812 (4th Cir.) (state classification program, cert. denied, 435 U.S.
1009 (1978); Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283, 287 (5th Cir. 1977) (same), cert. denied, 438
U.S. 915 (1978). See generally G. Alpert, Legal Rights of Prisoners 139 (1978).
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extension of such programs is insufficient, 383 and their rehabilitative effect is
rendered insubstantial, for the purposes of due process.'8 4
The intrinsic approach to due process would concentrate on the stigmatiza-
tion of classified prisoners who are deprived of access to rehabilitative
programs. Although this effect has been noted, 1 5 it has not been stressed in
granting due process protection. In Paul v. Davis, 186 the Supreme Court held
that an individual's reputation alone is not an interest that merits due process
protection.18 7 Nevertheless, any government action that results in damage to
an individual's reputation and subsequently deprives him of an independent
liberty or property interest does entitle the individual to the benefits of due
process; 188 this doctrine should scale prison walls and determine the rights of
the special offender.
Within the context of the correctional community, official prisoner status is
directly damaged by the classification system's attachment of "a badge of
infamy"' 19 through the designation of special offender status. This badge is
actually placed on the inmate's prison file,' 90 and the government recognizes
the seriousness of the stigma through the extensive procedure that must be
followed when a prisoner has successfully petitioned to be removed from the
classification system. 19' Neither the discretionary power of prison officials to
classify, nor the limitations on the prospective enjoyment of benefits, deter a
finding of entitlement because the grievous loss results from the lack of
alternatives to the foreclosed programs. 192 Because the inmate is precluded
183. Solomon v. Benson, 563 F.2d 339, 342 (7th Cir. 1977).
184. Hicks v. United States Bd. of Parole & Pardons, 550 F.2d 401, 404 (8th Cir. 1977).
185. Polizzi v. Sigler, 564 F.2d 792, 796 (8th Cir. 1977); Holmes v. United States Bd. of
Parole, 541 F.2d 1243, 1248 (7th Cir. 1976), overruled in part, Solomon v. Benson, 563 F.2d 339,
340 (7th Cir. 1977).
186. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
187. Id. at 711-12. The Court distinguished prior cases by noting that they had "deprived the
individual of a right previously held under state law." Id. at 708.
188. Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 436-37 (1971); see Cafeteria & Restaurant
Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 898 (1961); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344
U.S. 183, 190-91 (1952); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 184-85
(1951) (Jackson, J., concurring); United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 314 (1946); cf. Vitek v.
Jones, 48 U.S.L.W. 4317, 4319, 4321 (U.S. Mar. 25, 1980) (No. 78-1155) (prisoner suffers
"stigmatizing consequences" from involuntary transfer to mental hospital); Parham v. J.R., 442
U.S. 584, 601 (1979) (child committed to a state institution by his parents has a protectible
interest in not being stigmatized because of improper decision by medical board to accept the
child). But see Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564
(1972).
189. Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 191 (1952).
190. Bureau of Prisons, Policy Statement No. 7900.53A, at 5 (Dec. 1, 1977).
191. Id.
192. See Polizzi v. Sigler, 564 F.2d 792, 796 (8th Cir. 1977) (stigma of classification based on
organized crime ties may last beyond incarceration); Holmes v. United States Bd. of Parole, 541
F.2d 1243, 1248 (7th Cir. 1976) (stigma of classification will affect an inmate's access to furlough
and parole opportunities), overruled in part, Solomon v. Benson, 563 F.2d 339, 340 (7th Cir.
1977); cf. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 711-12 (1976) (flyer of active shoplifters did not deprive the
victim of a liberty or property interest); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574-75 (1975) (disciplinary
suspension sufficiently damaged the child's reputation to justify finding that he was deprived of
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from participating in other rehabilitative programs, he should be entitled to
due process protection.1 93
B. Parole Release and Revocation
Although due process requirements apply to all parole revocation proceed-
ings,' 94 these requirements are not always guaranteed for parole release
hearings.' 9" In distinguishing parole release from parole revocation, the
Supreme Court directed its attention to the nature of each decision., 96 The
parole release decision was characterized as "more subtle and depend[ing] on
an amalgam of elements, some of which are factual but many of which are
purely subjective appraisals by the Board members based upon their experi-
ence with the difficult and sensitive task of evaluating the advisability of
parole release.' 197 Therefore, because no set fact pattern will guarantee a
favorable decision,' 98 and because of the absolute discretion of the board, any
prisoner expectation of release cannot rise to the level of entitlement.
The Court's distinction, however, is inaccurate. The parole revocation
decision contains a mixture of fact and discretion similar to that of the release
decision. Although the first phase of the revocation decision is a wholly
"retrospective factual question" of the existence of a violation of parole, 199 the
second phase, which may result in revocation, is wholly discretionary and
based on the expertise of the authority.20 0 Whereas a favorable decision is
guaranteed when no violation is found, a violation will not automatically
result in the return of the parolee to prison.2 0 When the parole revocation
process enters the second phase, the functions of the release and revocation
bodies are identical. Because the decisions in both proceedings "hinge on
predictive determinations, those assessments are necessarily predicated on
findings of fact.120
2
The discretionary element in parole revocation led to arbitrary decisions,
before the proceedings were required to meet due process standards. 20 3 The
same arbitrary decisions concerning the futures of prisoners are still being
his right to attend school); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 (1972) (decision to release
a nontenured professor did not inflict stigma that made other employment unavailable).
193. See notes 178-79 supra and accompanying text.
194. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
195. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1 (1979); see
note 74 supra and accompanying text.
196. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1979).
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 479 (1972).
200. Id. at 480.
201. Id.
202. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 28 (1979)
(Marshall, J., dissenting in part) (footnote omitted); Williams v. Ward, 556 F.2d 1143, 1158 (2d
Cir.), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 944 (1977).
203. J. Mitford, supra note 29, at 225; see T. Wicker, supra note 17, at 26-27. The Attica
uprising provides a blatant example of the tragedy of uncontrolled proceedings. One inmate who




made in the uncontrolled parole release cases.20 4 Moreover, a taint of
arbitrariness remains in parole revocation situations. Difficulty occurs in
attaching due process rights to a parolee involved in a revocation proceeding
when the violation of parole is the commission of a crime. The parolee
imprisoned for a criminal act is not entitled to an immediate parole revocation
hearing because his incarceration does not depend on revocation. 20 5 If
"execution of the [parole violation] warrant and custody under that warrant
[are] the operative event[s] triggering any loss of liberty attendant upon parole
revocation, '20 6 the consequence is that a jailed parolee still enjoys conditional
liberty. Nevertheless, showing the utmost deference to the states, the Supreme
Court bases entitlement on procedures, not on the individual's interest. Only
when the state executes the warrant and recognizes the loss as sufficiently
grievous does the Court mandate due process protection. 20 7 The actual
restraint on the prisoner's liberty is seen as irrelevant. The rationale offered is
the discretion of parole authorities in deciding the manner or probability of
imprisonment for a parole violation while the inmate serves a sentence for a
crime committed during the parole sentence. 208 Discretion becomes a double-
edged sword, defeating a claim of entitlement, 20 9 yet assuaging any fears of
prolonged imprisonment. 210 If discretion can reduce a reasonable expectation
into a mere hope, however, its positive effects cannot be reasonably guaran-
teed to the prisoner when his period of incarceration depends on the possible
execution of the parole revocation warrant, the timing of which is left to the
whim of government.
The intrinsic approach would not accommodate such narrow logic. The
204. See Sharp v. Leonard, 611 F.2d 136 (6th Cir. 1979) (per curiam); Wagner v. Gilligan,
609 F.2d 866 (6th Cir. 1979) (per curiam). A recent survey conducted by the Council of State
Governments demonstrates that a majority of states have taken some legislative action to
circumvent parole boards' power because they are viewed as " 'arbitrary and capricious deci-
sionmakers.' " N.Y. Times, Mar. 30, 1980, § 1, at 27, col. 1. A majority of states have enacted
some form of mandatory sentencing laws for certain violent crimes so that the sentencing judge,
rather than the parole board, determines the actual sentence served. Id.
205. Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 86 (1976); cf. United States v. Jackson, 590 F.2d 121,
123 (5th Cir.) (according to statute for probation revocation, the arrest must be for a violation,
not for a criminal act, to be entitled to a hearing), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 912 (1979).
206. Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 87 (1976).
207. See id. at 88.
208. Id. at 87-88; Farmer v. United States Parole Comm'n, 588 F.2d 54, 56 (4th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 442 U.S. 943 (1979); see Northington v. United States Parole Comm'n, 587 F.2d 2, 3
(6th Cir. 1978); Hicks v. United States Bd. of Paroles & Pardons, 550 F.2d 401, 404 (8th Cir.
1977).
209. See Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 83-84 (1976). Federal law concerning detainees has
been changed. The Parole Commission must review a parole revocation warrant within 180 days
of its issuance. 18 U.S.C. § 4214 (b)(1) (1976). Presently, the Parole Commission's preferred policy
is for the term imposed for revocation to run consecutively with the sentence imposed for the
subsequent offense. 28 C.F.R. § 2.47(c) (1979). The legislative and administrative changes,
however, did not affect the Supreme Court's decision in Moody. The case is still demonstrative of
the Court's reluctance to help prisoners and still provides precedent for state and federal courts to
deny further due process protection to prisoners. See State ex rel. Alvarez v. Lotter, 91 Wis, 2d
329, 334-35, 283 N.W.2d 408, 410 (1979) (per curiam).
210. Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 87-88 (1976).
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uncertainty of status has a recognized detrimental effect on rehabilitation. 21'
Because of the adversity involved, there is an added burden on caseworkers
who try to aid the prisoner in the rehabilitative process. 2 12 The impact on
both the system and the inmate causes a grievous loss that must entitle the
inmate to due process protection.
C. The Common Bonds
Two common themes exist in the present ad hoc approach to prisoners' due
process rights. Rehabilitation is the affirmative theme. Each significant aspect
of the prison system-discipline, release, and revocation-affects the rehabili-
tation of prisoners. 21 3 Release and revocation are intertwined, and both are
determinative of the success of the rehabilitative process. Although revocation
proceedings are presented with demonstrable and concrete proof, 2 14 the proof
in a release hearing is more implicit because an element of prognostication is
involved. Characterization is the only true difference, 215 and it should not
erect a barrier between the two aspects. Discipline can either enhance
rehabilitation by providing a proper medium for internal correctional pro-
grams, or damage it by using denial of access to such programs as punish-
ment. Together, the three aspects of the prison system form a rehabilitative
strategy that must be protected by fair procedures for proper implementation.
Because the government creates the rehabilitative programs and encourages
inmate participation, the prisoner has a reasonable expectation of due process
protection.
The negative theme is the Court's focus on the discretionary powers of
prison authorities to defeat inmate entitlement. The "full" discretion
21 6 of
prison officials has become absolute because of judicial review. Presently,
prisoners must somehow show a statutory limitation on the exercise of
discretion to prove the existence of a liberty interest entitled to protection.
217
The total grant of discretion renews the old "hands-off" doctrine of judicial
211. "Because uncertainty as to status can have an adverse effect on our efforts to provide
offenders with correctional services, we should encourage detaining authorities to dispose of
pending untried charges against offenders in federal custody." Bureau of Prisons, Policy State-
ment No. 7500.14A, at 1 (Jan. 7, 1970); see Moody v. Daggett. 429 U.S. 78. 94-95 (1976)
(Stevens, J., dissenting). In Moody, however, the Supreme Court again ignored policy and
followed the positivist view of statutory due process. Id. at 84-85; see notes 70-71 supra and
accompanying text; cf. United States v. Tyler, 605 F.2d 851, 853 (5th Cir. 1979) (per curiam)
(probationer entitled to due process protection because he was unduly prejudiced by significant
delay between commission of probation violation and filing of petition to revoke).
212. Bureau of Prisons, Policy Statement No. 7500.14A, at 4 Uan. 7, 1970); see Moody v.
Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 94 n.9 (1976).
213. See pts. II(A)-(B) supra.
214. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 479 (1972).
215. Compare Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 9-10
(1979) with id. at 27-28 (Marshall, J., dissenting in part).
216. See Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 228-29 (1976); Farmer v. United States Parole
Comm'n, 588 F.2d 54, 56 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 943 (1979).
217. Arsberry v. Sielaff, 586 F.2d 37, 46-47 (7th Cir. 1978); Lombardo v. Meachum, S48
F.2d 13, 14-15 (1st Cir. 1977).
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intervention based on statutory interpretation. 21 8 As a result, the prisoner is
helpless.
Discretion is inherently limited because it cannot be exercised in a vacuum.
The parameters of any subjective evaluation are structured by a factual
investigation mandated either by statute21 9 or policy.220 Unless there is a
framework for the discretionary action, it becomes arbitrary, thereby mandat-
ing due process protection.2 2 ' The intrinsic approach would structure the use
of discretion by examining the rehabilitative policy of the prison system and
emphasizing the correctional factor in both fact-finding and subjective evalu-
ations. This restriction on the use of discretion creates the entitlement on
which prisoners may rely to guarantee due process protection.
These common bonds give context to any government deprivation inflicted
on the inmate because they define the source and scope of the government's
power and the individual inmate's interest. The weight of these bonds
equalizes the interests of the disciplined inmate, the parolee, and the prospec-
tive parolee. Therefore, the determination of entitlement for all prisoners
should be made under a unified analysis.
III. WHAT PROCESS Is DUE
In Mathews v. Eldridge,222 the Supreme Court identified three factors that
would delineate specific procedures to be followed in determining what
process is due.
218. Under the old "hands-off" policy, prison procedures were outside the scope of judicial
intervention. H. Hoffman, supra note 111, at 1-12. The policy's foundations were the com-
plementary reasons of prisoner forfeiture of constitutional rights and noninterference with prison
administration. J. Mitford, supra note 29, at 249. Although the first reason is no longer
sustainable, see note 95 supra and accompanying text, the second has gained new credence when
coupled with the positivist view of due process. For example, if parole is denied, judicial review
is permissible only if sufficient facts are alleged, which if proved, would establish that the parole
board's action was arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. Payne v. United States, 539
F.2d 443 (5th Cir. 1976) (per curiam), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1103 (1977); Cunningham v. Estelle,
536 F.2d 82 (5th Cir. 1976) (per curiam); Buchanan v. Clark, 446 F.2d 1379 (5th Cir.) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 979 (1971); Tarlton v. Clark, 441 F.2d 384 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 403 U.S. 934 (1971); Thompkins v. United States Bd. of Parole, 427 F.2d 222 (5th Cir.
1970) (per curiam). Such limited access to courts allows prisons to operate with a free hand. The
new "hands-off" policy is only one part of the Supreme Court's general trend of limiting due
process rights because of a fear that the new property concept originated in Goldberg v, Kelly,
397 U.S. 254 (1970), opened the floodgates to endless litigation. Rabin, supra note 8, at 70.
219. See, e.g., Williams v. Ward, 556 F.2d 1143, 1158 (2d Cir.) (New York statute set
parameters for the exercise of discretion in determining parole release), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S.
944 (1977); United States ex rel. Johnson v. Chairman of N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, 500 F.2d 925,
929-30 (2d Cir.) (same), vacated as moot sub nom. Regan v. Johnson, 419 U.S. 1015 (1974),
overruled, Boothe v. Hammock, 605 F.2d 661, 664 (2d Cir. 1979).
220. See, e.g., Winsett v. McGinnes, No. 74-210, slip op. at 19, 21 (2d Cir. Mar. 24, 1980)
(en banc) (exercise of discretion must be consistent with work-release policy, and parameters are
defined by promulgated regulations); Durso v. Rowe, 579 F.2d 1365, 1371 (7th Cir. 1978) (prison
practices and policies guide the discretionary revocation of work-release participation), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1121 (1979); Tracy v. Salamack, 440 F. Supp. 930, 934-35 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)
(same), aff'd, 572 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1978).
221. Masiello v. Norton, 364 F. Supp. 1133, 1136 (D. Conn. 1973).
222. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
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First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk
of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the
probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally,
the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and adminis-
trative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would en-
tail. 22 3
The Mathews test has been criticized for its utilitarian policy of attempting to
realize the greatest good for the greatest number, at the expense of the
traditional due process notions of decency and fairness for the individual.2 24
Inside prison walls, however, the intrinsic approach to due process strikes a
delicate balance between the individual and the government, whereby indi-
vidual treatment can be provided to the inmate population in all aspects of
the rehabilitative process.
The first variable of private interest fluctuates under the conditional liberty
or statutory due process theories because of factual circumstances, such as the
magnitude of the interest 225 or the specific dictates of the relevant statute.2 26
Under the intrinsic approach, this factor becomes a constant because the
private interest will always be the rehabilitative process.227 The parolee in a
revocation hearing would have the same interest as the inmate in a disciplin-
ary hearing for the revocation of work-release participation.
The second Mathews factor is subject to much misinterpretation; the Court
used it in Greenholtz to restrict available procedural safeguards. The majority
evaluated the Nebraska statutory provisions exclusively in terms of minimiz-
ing the risk of error. 228 The majority's analysis supposedly included the
"probable value of additional or substitute safeguards" test of Mathews.'-29
The analysis, however, merely demonstrated circular reasoning because the
"probable value" of the procedure was undercut by defining it as a back-up
system for the additional elimination of error.2 30 The value of any additional
safeguards should be weighed in relation to their contribution to the re-
habilitative process;23 1 in this respect, due process itself implements a re-
habilitative strategy. 232 The certain procedures that the Supreme Court had
established in Morrissey v. Brewer2 33 and Wolff v. McDonnell 234 would be
223. Id. at 335.
224. Calhoun, supra note 71, at 230; Mashaw, supra note 90, at 48-49; Interest Balancing,
supra note 8, at 1542-43.
225. Compare Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex. 442 U S. 1, 9-11
(1979) (parole release as a prospective enjoyment of conditional liberty) with Morrissey v. Brewer,
408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972) (parole revocation as a present enjoyment of conditional liberty).
226. Compare Meachurn v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 228-29 (1976) (prison transfers have no
statutory limitations) -ith Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 552 (1974) (statute providing
criteria for revocation of good time credit).
227. See note 108 supra and accompanying text.
228. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1. 13 (1979).
229. Id. at 13-14; see Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
230. See 442 U.S. at 32-33 (Marshall, J., dissenting in part).
231. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 562-63 (1974); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S.
778, 785 (1973); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 484 (1972).
232. See pt. IV infra.
233. 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972).
234. 418 U.S. 539, 564-71 (1974).
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more successful if used as safeguards of the prisoner's dignity under the
intrinsic approach than as formulas for utilitarian precision.2 3 Although
error-free decisions are an important element in the decent treatment of
inmates, accuracy should not be the sole consideration.
The function of due process in maintaining administrative accuracy must
be distinguished from its ability to prevent arbitrary decisions. 2 36 Among the
attributes of procedural due process is that no "better way [has] been found
for generating the feeling ... that justice has been done."23 7 Even though the
individual may disagree with the result of a hearing, he can voice no
dissatisfaction with the method used to reach the decision.2 38 The beneficial
psychological effect of according procedural clue process is especially impor-
tant in the prison setting, for it can provide a safety valve for prisoner anger
and resentment against a seemingly unsympathetic system. 239 A fair and just
procedure may help prison officials in maintaining internal control, as well as
in making the prisoner more susceptible to rehabilitative efforts. Cosmetic
fairness, however, is second to the genuine fairness that due process can
provide by existing as a check against the arbitrary use of discretionary
power.240 Although the proceeding may appear fair, the decision may still be
arbitrary and capricious. Additional safeguards are insurance for genuine
fairness by providing a means for an exterior check. 24 ' An abuse of power
would only defeat the rehabilitative strategy. These positive values must be
considered in determining what process is due inmates.
The third Mathews factor of government interest involves practical consid-
erations of how procedural due process will effectuate official policy. Accep-
tance of the intrinsic approach would acknowledge that the government
interest lies in the rehabilitation of inmates 242 and that administrative details
235. L. Tribe, supra note 5, § 10-15, at 554; Mashaw, supra note 90, at 48.
236. Rabin, supra note 8, at 77-78; Interest Balancing, supra note 8, at 1517 n.35.
237. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 172 (1951) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
238. See United States ex rel. Johnson v. Chairman of N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, 500 F.2d
925, 930 (2d Cir.), vacated as moot sub nom. Regan v. Johnson, 419 U.S. 1015 (1974), overruled,
Boothe v. Hammock, 605 F.2d 661, 664 (2d Cir. 1979); Interest Balancing, supra note 8, at 1517
n.35.
239. See T. Wicker, supra note 17, at 3-18. The disciplining of problem prisoners by placing
them in solitary confinement was the catalyst of the Attica uprising. That one of the "disciplined"
prisoners was only marginally suspected of being involved in a shoving incident in the prison yard
illustrates the potential for the abuse of discretion. Id. at 9-11. Almost a decade later, Attica is
still permeated with an atmosphere of tension and imminent prisoner violence, N.Y. Times, Feb.
1, 1980, § B, at 1, col. 3. Although a grievance committee has been formed to solve prison
problems such as abuse of disciplinary power, it has been criticized as a safety valve for tension
because the prison administration maintains total control of the system. N.Y. Times, Feb. 23,
1980, at 1, col. 4. The manner in which problems are handled remains a source of prison unrest.
See id.
240. Stassi v. Hogan, 395 F. Supp. 141, 145 (N.D. Ga. 1975), overruled, Mayo v. Sigler, 428
F. Supp. 1343 (N.D. Ga. 1977).
241. United States ex rel. Johnson v. Chairman of N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, 500 F.2d 925,
930 (2d Cir.), vacated as moot sub nom. Regan v. Johnson. 419 U.S. 1015 (1974), overruled,
Boothe v. Hammock, 605 F.2d 661, 664 (2d Cir. 1979); see note 218 supra.
242. See note 108 supra and accompanying text.
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should not deter that motive unless the main goal would be totally defeat-
ed. 243 For instance, a hearing that called for an impartial panel of judges from
the circuit in which the prison is located would cause unreasonable delay and
limit the number of possible hearings. The government function of rehabilita-
tion must be analyzed in determining granted procedures. 244 In all facets of
the prison system, the authorities act after a determination of the success or
failure of the rehabilitative process. For example, a parole revocation implies
that the conditioned experiment in demonstrating that liberty can be properly
used has failed. When parole is granted, the internal efforts to prepare the
inmate for the outside world have initially succeeded.
Any mandated procedure must be workable or become self-defeating. The
viability of the Wolff and Morrissey procedures have been proved through
their use and adoption.245 Administrative agencies, such as parole boards, are
usually authorized to act in accordance with the procedures normally asso-
ciated with due process. 246 If the use of these procedures is judicially or
legislatively mandated and proved workable, the need for discretion to define
the procedure due is minimal and no longer as important as some courts
believe. 247 Thus, discretion becomes merely a factor that should be exercised
in extraordinary circumstances; 248 it is a factor that is always subject to
judicial review. 249 Discretion can then be used to define the form of the
243. Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 580 (8th Cir. 1968); S. Rep. No. 96-416, supra note 99,
at 15 ("It should be noted that many of the orders imposed on corrections administrators have
involved neither excessive time nor money."); cf. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 130S, 1315 (5th
Cir. 1974) (the institutionalized should not be deprived of their due process rights because of
costs).
244. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
245. While the Morrissey procedures have been codified, 18 U.S.C. §§ 4214(c)-(d) (1976); 28
C.F.R. § 2.50 (1979), the Wolff procedures have not been adopted. One commentator, however,
has asserted that the Woff procedures will continue to govern prison disciplinary hearings.
J. Palmer, supra note 67, § 8.3, at 108-12. In Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Correctional
Complex, 442 U.S. 1 (1979), the Nebraska parole authorities had actually adopted many of the
procedures prescribed in Wolff. Id. at 4-5.
246. See Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurt-
er, J., concurring). Prison proceedings are considered more analogous to administrative hearings
than to criminal trials. See Corrections, supra note 120, at 402.
247. See, e.g., Franklin v. Shields, 569 F.2d 800, 800 (4th Cir.) (en banc) (per curiam)
(procedures involved in a parole release hearing depended on the exercise of discretion by the
Virginia parole authorities), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1003 (1978); Young v. Duckworth, - Ind.
.==_,394 N.E.2d 123, 126 (1979) (Indiana courts will not review the statutory grant of
discretion to the parole board to determine proper procedures for parole release hearings).
248. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Carson v. Taylor, 540 F.2d 1156, 1160, 1162 (2d Cir.
1976) (unusual circumstances lessen the demands of due process); Meyers v. Alldredge, 492 F.2d
296, 307 (3d Cir. 1974) (inmate work stoppages considered unusual circumstances); Biagiarelli v.
Sielaff, 483 F.2d 508, 511-12 (3d Cir. 1973) (conspiracy to escape justified imposition of solitary
confinement); United States ex rel. Arzonica v. Scheipe, 474 F.2d 720, 722 (3d Cir. 1973) (prison
officials may exercise discretion in exigent circumstances).
249. Calabro v. United States Bd. of Parole, 525 F.2d 660, 661 (5th Cir. 1975), see
McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 269 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("due process forbids
the States to adopt procedures that would defeat the institution of . . . judicial review").
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mandated procedures, thereby preserving the needed flexibility inherent in
due process.
25 0
IV. PARAMETERS OF THE PROCESS DUE
A. Minimum Criteria
Although the intrinsic approach dictates a structure for procedural due
process, the inherent elasticity in each element will preserve flexibility.
Certain minimum criteria must be met to satisfy intrinsic due process and to
fulfill the rehabilitative strategy.
1. Notice
Notice, a fundamental due process requirement, 25 1 is essential to inform the
prisoner of the nature of the government action and to enable him to gather
the facts that air his side of the story. 252 The notice must be reasonable in
both time and manher. 253 The standard of reasonableness inherent in the
notice requirement maintains a certain amount of flexibility; lower courts,
however, have attempted to define specific attributes of adequate notice. 25 4
The basic format consists of a personally delivered written statement of facts
that allows a reasonable time period for the inmate to prepare. 255 The time
factor is' mbst important because unreasonable notice will nullify the pris-
oner's opportunity to be heard. 25 6 The measure of time can vary, 257 but as in
the parole revocation cases, 258 it must include the period in which information
250. See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
251. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267-68 (1970); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 33-34 & n.54
(1967); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314-15 (1950); Friendly,
supra note 54, at 1280.
252. Vitek v. Jones, 48 U.S.L.W. 4317, 4321 (U.S. Mar. 25, 1980) (No. 78-1155); Greenholtz
v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 37-38 (1979) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting in part); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 564 (1974); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S.
778, 786 (1973); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 486-87 (1972); Franklin v. Shields, 569 F.2d
784, 794 (4th Cir. 1977), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 569 F.2d 800 (4th Cir.) (en banc) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1003 (1978); J. Palmer, supra note 67, § 8.3.1, at 113.
253. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co , 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
254. Sands v. Wainwright, 357 F. Supp. 1062, 1085-86 (M.D. Fla.), vacated on other
grounds, 491 F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 992 (1974); Landman v. Royster,
333 F. Supp. 621, 653 (E.D. Va. 1971); Sinclair v. Henderson, 331 F. Supp. 1123, 1129 (E.D.
La. 1971); Morris v. Travisono, 310 F. Supp. 857, 870 (D.R.I. 1970).
255. Sands v. Wainwright, 357 F. Supp. 1062, 1086 (M.D. Fla.), vacated on other grounds,
491 F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 992 (1974).
256. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 21 (1979)
(Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
257. See, e.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 564 (1972) (24 hours); Greenholtz v.
Inmates of Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex, 576 F.2d 1274, 1283 (8th Cir. 1978) (minimum of
72 hours), rev'd and remanded, 442 U.S. 1 (1979); Cardaropoli v. Norton, 523 F.2d 990, 996 (2d
Cir. 1975) (minimum of 10 days notice) (implicitly overruled in Pugliese v. Nelson, Nos. 79-2136,
-2138, -2140 (2d Cir. Mar. 4, 1980)).
258. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 485 (1972) (inquiry should be speedily under-
taken); Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225, 243-44 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc) (Burger, J.) (same), cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 957 (1963). But see Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 87 (1976) (immediate
hearing not required because prospect of future incarceration is uncertain).
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is current and sources remain available.25 9 The inmate's ability to prepare
adequately is the controlling factor in determining the time element.
Normally, the notice given to prisoners must be in writing because in
practice, oral notice and the opportunity to be heard tend to blur together
because the notice is given virtually contemporaneous with the hearing.2 6
The Third Circuit, however, has approved the adequacy of oral notice. 26 1
The court reasoned that prisoners gain a minimal benefit in the preparation of
written notice because it does not alter the character of any prison proceed-
ing.2 62 Such an approach is a unilateral examination of the nature of notice.
Oral notice should be restricted to emergency disciplinary situations in which
control of the prison is imperative.2 63 In such cases, oral notice does not
subvert the basic goal of rehabilitation, and it provides prison officials with
the necessary discretion to run their prisons effectively. The notice require-
ment places only a minimal burden on the administration of prison proceed-
ings.2
64
2. Disclosure by the Authorities of Evidence in Their Possession
In a disciplinary or revocation proceeding, the prisoner should be entitled to
know the nature of the evidence that will be presente.d to enable him to rebut
the charges or to show the existence of mitigating circumstances. 2 61 In these
situations, the procedure is an undisputed right in which discretion should
play no part.2 66 In the parole release situation, however, this requirement
should take the form of publishing the parole release criteria. "Articulation of
criteria is crucial: . . The notion of an inmate's participation in a program of
change depends on an open informaion system. His sense of just treatment is
inextricably bound with it."2 67 Disclosure would allow the inmate to marshal
the facts for presentation to the parole board. Furthermore, it would also
become a part of the rehabilitative strategy by informing the inmate of the
panoply of criteria being used to shape his future. The intrinsic approach,
because of the inherent emphasis on rehabilitation, would mandate this
procedure.
259. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 485 (1972); Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225, 243-44
(D.C. Cir.) (en banc) (Burger, J.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 957 (1963).
260. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 564 (1974).
261. Braxton v. Carlson, 483 F.2d 933, 94142 (3d Cir. 1973).
262. Id.; see Meyers v. Alldredge, 492 F.2d 296, 307 & n.33 (3d Cir. 1974).
263. Meyers v. Alldredge, 492 F.2d 296, 307 (3d Cir. 1974); cf. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565,
582-83 (1975) (school disciplinary action).
264. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 565 (1974).
265. Id. at 563-64; see Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 487 (1972); Nimmo v. Simpson,
370 F. Supp. 103, 105 (E.D. Va. 1974).
266. Friendly, supra note 54, at 1283.
267. Corrections, supra note 120 at 397; see Franklin v. Shields, 569 F.2d 784, 793 (4th Cir.
1977), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 569 F.2d 800, 800 (4th Cir.) (en banc) (per curiam) (approval
of procedure based on prior practice, although not constitutionally mandated), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 1003 (1978); Childs v. United States Bd. of Parole, 511 F.2d 1270, 1284-85 (D.C. Cir. 1974);
28 C.F.R. §§ 2.18-.20 (1979). See also Haymes v. Regan, 525 F.2d 540, 543 (2d Cir. 1975);
Note, The Applicability of Due Process and State Freedom of Information Acts to Parole Release
Hearings, 27 Syracuse L. Rev. 1011, 1024 & n.69 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Parole Release
Hearings].
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Prior denials of parole criteria have been premised on the similarity
between the functions of disclosure and of a written statement of reasons for
denial. 268 Because the written statement provides post facto protection of
prisoners, 269 it is argued that the publication of criteria becomes super-
fluous. 270 This rationale is indicative of the cost benefit analysis of
Mathews, 27' which ignores the additional correctional values of disclosure. A
publication requirement would result in no substantial burden on the adminis-
tration and no invasion of the parole board's discretionary powers. 272
3. An Opportunity to be Heard
The prisoner's opportunity to be heard generally takes the form of a
personal hearing,2 73 in which a factual determination is combined with the
exercise of discretion. 274 In mandating that this opportunity be provided, the
Supreme Court's main concern has been that the correctional proceeding not
become adversarial or akin to a formal criminal prosecution. 275 Correctional
proceedings have flexible rules so that unlike a formal trial, the proceeding
can consider a broad range of information. 276 The delaying tactics and other
abuses of the criminal justice system are to be especially avoided. 277 More-
over, the nature of an adversarial proceeding would defeat the rehabilitative
strategy by creating tension between the government and the inmate. 278
Allowing an inmate presentation, however, would not automatically create an
adversarial proceeding because the nature of a correctional proceeding is to
gather and evaluate information, a process in which the prisoner can assist, 279
The intrinsic approach supports personal participation because it creates
268. See Haymes v. Regan, 525 F.2d 540, 543-44 (2d Cir. 1975). But see Franklin v. Shields,
569 F.2d 784, 792-93 (4th Cir. 1977), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 569 F.2d 800, 800 (4th Cir.)
(en banc) (per curiam) (disclosure mandated because a reasons requirement did not exist), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 1003 (1978).
269. See notes 311-12 infra and accompanying text.
270. Haymes v. Regan, 525 F.2d 540, 543-44 (2d Cir. 1975).
271. See notes 223-24 supra and accompanying text.
272. Franklin v. Shields, 569 F.2d 784, 793 (4th Cir. 1977), aff'd in part and rev'd in part,
569 F.2d 800 (4th Cir) (en banc) (per curiam), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1003 (1978).
273. See J. Palmer, supra note 67, § 8.3.2, at 114; Franklin v. Shields, 569 F.2d 784, 796 (4th
Cir. 1977), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 569 F.2d 800 (4th Cir.) (en banc) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 1003 (1978).
274. J. Palmer, supra note 67, § 8.3.2, at 114-16; see pt. II(B) supra.
275. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 14, 15-16
(1979); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 567 (1974).
276. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972); J. Palmer, supra note 67, § 9.4.3, at 141.
277. See pt. II(B) supra.
278. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1979);
Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc) (Burger, .1.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 957 (1963).
In reference to parole revocation hearings, Chief Justice Burger, then on the District of Columbia
Circuit, characterized the relationship as "not ... pursuer and quarry but a relationship
partaking of parens patriae." Id. at 237.
279. Zurak v. Regan, 550 F.2d 86, 95 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 914 (1977);
Corrections, supra note 120, at 403; see Mashaw, supra note 90, at 50. Contra, Greenholtz v.
Inmates of Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 15 (1979).
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dignity, self-respect, and a sense of fairness.280 Even if a hearing is charac-
terized as discretionary, it can address the question of how the discretion
should be exercised in the circumstances.2 8 ' Although the prisoner may be
challenging the board's authority, the proceeding would not become adver-
sarial because the focus of the fact-finding function shifts to the board by
examining how it arrived at the decision. 282
In Greenholtz, the Supreme Court disputed the necessity of personal
hearings in parole release proceedings because it felt that the factual issues are
never so complex to necessitate inmate participation to minimize the risk of
error.2 8 3 Even if some kind of hearing is granted, the allowance of a personal
appearance would depend on "the susceptibility of the particular subject
matter to written presentation, on the ability of the complainant to under-
stand the case against him and to present his arguments effectively in written
form, and on the administrative costs." '28 4 The Supreme Court's faith in the
accuracy of data used by parole boards is unfounded; 285 prisoner input would
be valuable, at least in presenting the board with a chance to compare the
inmate to their compilation of data. The alternative of written presentation is
inflexible because the inmate must commit himself blindly without knowing
the board's interests in making its decision. Furthermore, it is devoid of the
benefits arising from the natural flow of conversation concerning specific
issues and matters of importance that an uneducated prisoner can only
ascertain through a personal appearance. 28 6 The major objection to a per-
sonal hearing has been the expense involved.287 Under the intrinsic approach,
cost should never be a consideration unless totally prohibitive.2 8
In stating his position, the prisoner should be allowed to present supporting
280. Mashaw, supra note 90, at 50; see Summers, Evaluating and Improving Legal
Process-A Plea for "Process Values", 60 Cornell L. Rev. 1. 23 (1974Y
281. See L. Tribe, supra note 5, § 10-12, at 533 n.3.
282. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 785 (1973).
283. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S 1, 14-15 (1979),
see Zurak v. Regan, 550 F.2d 86, 95 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 914 (1977).
284. Friendly, supra note 54, at 1281 (footnote oriitted); see Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.
319, 347 (1976).
285. See Note, Prisoner Access to Parole Files: A Due Process Analysis, 47 Fordham L. Rev-
260, 275 (1978); Parole Release Hearings, supra note 267, at 1027.
286. See S. Rep. No. 96-416, supra note 99, at 19. ("[M]any institutionalized persons are
intellectually and emotionally incapable of understanding the concept of legal rights, while others
are conditioned to accept their institutional environments without question Many are inarticu-
late, and most are uneducated."); cf. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 269 (1970) (welfare
recipients).
287. Friendly, supra note 54, at 1276 & n.54; see Wheeler v. Montgomery, 397 U S 280, 284
& n.3 (1970) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
288. Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318, 330 (M.D. Ala. 1976) ("a state is not at liberty to
afford its citizens only those constitutional rights which fit comfortably within its budget"), off'd
and remanded sub nom. Newman v. State, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'd in part and
remanded sub nom. Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978) (per curiam); see Fuentes v. Shevin,
407 U.S. 67, 90 n.22 (1972) (administrative costs cannot justify failure to accord constitutional
procedures); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 540-41 (1971) (same); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U'S. 254,
261 (1970) (same); note 243 supra and accompanying text.
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witnesses and documentary evidence. 28 9 Any hazards engendered by such
presentation are considerably less than those attending a grant of the right of
confrontation. 290 This facet of the opportunity to be heard is especially helpful
in discretionary decisions. A potential parolee could obtain evidence from a
prospective employer about the type of work available, and from his family
about the home to which he will return. 291 An inmate threatened with
revocation of his work-release program could have his employer testify about
the progress he has made on the job. A transferee could present his work from
a prison educational program that would be disrupted.
Prison authorities have the discretion to exclude any prisoner evidence that
is irrelevant, unnecessary, or hazardous.2 92 Prison officials therefore have
control over the subject matter of a proceeding. For example, a parole hearing
is not an opportunity to relitigate an adverse decision in a disciplinary
hearing. 293 Redundant witnesses may be excluded as time wasting, or, if an
unmanageable number of persons are called from the prison population, other
witnesses may be excluded as security threats. 294 A security threat may be a
valid reason for the exercise of discretion because the lack of discipline or loss
of control would undermine the rehabilitative process. 295 A suggested mech-
anism to prevent the abuse of discretion, and to aid the hearing process, is the
submission of written requests by prisoners to present witnesses, accompanied
by a summary of their testimony. A denial should be included in the record
with an explanation. 296 Informal depositions may also be used to facilitate the
proceeding and to preclude the abuse of discretion by prison authorities. 29 7
4. Impartial Board
An impartial board is an imperative factor in all cases in which a hearing is
required. 298 Any correctional decision must be based exclusively on the facts
'89. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 567 (1974); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,
489 (1972).
290. Franklin v. Shields, 569 F.2d 784, 796 (4th Cir. 1977), aff'd in part and rev'd in part,
F.2d 800 (4th Cir.) (en banc) 569 (per curiam), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1003 (1978); Workman v.
Mitchell, 502 F.2d 1201, 1210 (9th Cir. 1974); United States ex rel. Miller v. Twomey, 479 F.2d
701, 715 (7th Cir. 1973); Murphy v. Wheaton, 381 F. Supp. 1252, 1255 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
291. Franklin v. Shields, 569 F.2d 784, 796 (4th Cir. 1977), aff'd in part and rev'd in part,
569 F.2d 800 (4th Cir.) (en banc) (per curiam), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1003 (1978).
292. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 566 (1974).
293. Franklin v. Shields, 569 F.2d 784 (4th Cir. 1977), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 569
F.2d 800 (4th Cir.) (en banc) (per curiam), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1003 (1978).
294. J. Palmer, supra note 67, § 8.3.4, at 117.
295. See notes 348-49 infra and accompanying text.
296. J. Palmer, supra note 67, § 8.3.4, at 117. The record may be a necessary tool for judicial
review, especially in examining the exercise of discretion in shaping the procedural structure, See
Friendly, supra note 54, at 1292. See also Catalano v. United States, 383 F. Supp. 346, 352 (D.
Conn. 1974).
297. J. Palmer, supra note 67, § 8.3.4, at 117; see Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782-83
n.5 (1973); United States ex rel. Sims v. Sielaff, 563 F.2d 821, 823 n.4 (7th Cir. 1977).
298. Vitek v. Jones, 48 U.S.L.W. 4317, 4321 (U.S. Mar. 25, 1980) (No. 78-1155); Morrissey
v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972); see Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261 (1970); Meyers v.
Alldredge, 492 F.2d 296, 305-06 (3d Cir. 1974); Friendly, supra note 54, at 1279-80; Harvard
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presented to the board. Partiality can take two forms-factual or interest.
Factual partiality involves a board member who contributes information to
the fact-finding function of the board, in addition to evaluating his own
information. 299 Standards have been articulated to exclude prison personnel
who have actively participated in the matter before any of the various prison
authorities; 300 these standards must be maintained to provide a prisoner with
due process. For example, a member of a prison disciplinary hearing should
not be a member of the board that hears the same prisoner's petition for
parole.
3 0 1
Interest partiality or "command influence" 30 2 presents a more troublesome
issue, because the involvement of a prison authority, such as a warden, biases
the proceeding. Although it has been agreed that a predisposition of a
proceeding is improper, most courts have refused to sustain challenges against
the composition of the decisionmaking bodies, 30 3 relying on their power to
reverse blatantly arbitrary decisions. 30 4 Consequently, the subtlety of interest
partiality can escape the court if the predetermination is, nevertheless, backed
by evidence. The subversive influence is camouflaged by the propriety of the
decision. This is an example of cosmetic fairness. 30 5 As in factual partiality,
guidelines must be established. The initiator of an action or any of his
subordinates should not be allowed to participate in a prison disciplinary
hearing because of the temptation to abuse power. 30 6 The intrinsic approach
C-enter for Criminal Justice, Judicial Intervention in Prison Discipline, 63 J. Crim. L.C. & P.S.
200, 210 (1972). See also Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 61-62 (1972) (impartial
judge); In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) (same).
299. See, e.g., Finney v. Arkansas Bd. of Correction, 505 F.2d 194, 208 (8th Cir. 1974);
Meyers v. Alldredge, 492 F.2d 296, 305-07 (3d Cir. 1974); Powell v. Ward, 392 F. Supp. 628, 633
(S.D.N.Y. 1975), modified, 542 F.2d 101 (2d Cir. 1976); Fife v. Crist, 380 F. Supp. 901, 910-11
(D. Mont. 1974); Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621, 653 (E.D. Va. 1971). Contra, FRussell v.
Division of Corrections, 392 F. Supp. 476, 477 (W.D. Va.), aff'd mein., 530 F.2d 969 (4th Cir.
1975).
300. Sands v. Wainwright, 357 F. Supp. 1062, 1084 (M.D. Fla.), vacated on other grounds,
491 F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 992 (1974); see, e.g., United States ex rel.
Neal v. Wolfe, 346 F. Supp. 569, 575 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621,
653 (E.D. Va. 1971). In Sands, the court stated: "[A] member of a disciplinary committee is
disqualified from service thereon in any and every case in which (1) he has participated as an
investigating or reviewing officer, or (2) he is a witness, or (3) he is a person charged with a
subsequent review of the decision, or (4) he has any personal knowledge of any material fact, or
(5) he has any prior material involvement, or (6) he has any personal interest in the outcome." 357
F. Supp. at 1084. Prison personnel should not be unilaterally excluded, however, because their
experience qualifies them to serve, and the nature of their position does not always cause an
inherent bias. Id. at 1085.
301. See J. Palmer, supra note 67, § 9.4.1, at 139.
302. Collins v. Vitek, 375 F. Supp. 856, 860 (D.N.H. 1974); see Crooks v. Warne, 516 F.2d
837, 839-40 (2d Cir. 1975).
303. Crooks v. Warne, 516 F.2d 837, 839-40 (2d Cir. 1975); Collins v. Vitek, 375 F. Supp.
856, 860 (D.N.H. 1974); Nimmo v. Simpson, 370 F. Supp. 103, 107 (E.D. Va. 1974); Pearson v.
Townsend, 362 F. Supp. 207, 221 (D.S.C. 1973).
304. Nimmo v. Simpson, 370 F. Supp. 103, 107 (E.D. Va. 1974).
305. See notes 240-41 supra and accompanying text.
306. Collins v. Vitek, 375 F. Supp. 856, 860 (D.N.H. 1974); Colligan v. United States, 349 F.
Supp. 1233, 1237 (E.D. Mich. 1972).
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stresses prevention, rather than correction, because of the emphasis on human
dignity.307
5. A Written Statement of Reasons for an Adverse Decision
A written statement of reasons is one of the most beneficial procedures
available to the inmate because of the protection provided when preparation
time is accorded. 308 The content of the statement cannot be mere "boiler
plate" language that is vague and meaningless to the average prisoner, 30 9 but
must supply general explanatory reasons and the basis in fact for the action. 310
"It does no good to tell a prisoner he is being denied parole because he is a
danger to society unless he is told why he is so regarded, and whether there is
anything he can do to convince the Board otherwise."
3 11
As a check on the discretionary powers of a correctional board, the written
statement serves two interrelated functions. First, by articulating its findings,
the correctional board creates a powerful internal preventive against errone-
ous decisions. 3 12 Because the board knqws that it must commit itself on
paper, the members are forced to examine all relevant information. Judicial
review provides a further check on the board's powers after delivery of the
307. See note- 90 supra and accompanying text.
308. Judge Friendly, in rating the importance of certain elements of procedural due process,
classified a written statement of reasons as an "item close to the top ... of the scale." Friendly,
supra note 54, at 1292 (footnote omitted).
309. Billiteri v. United States Bd. of Parole, 385 F. Supp. 1217, 1220 (W.D.N.Y. 1974),
rev'd on other grounds, 541 F.2d 938 (2d Cir. 1976); Candarini v. Attorney Gen., 369 F. Supp.
1132 (E.D.N.Y. 1974). In Candarini, the rejected language was: "'Your release at this time
would depreciate the seriousness of the offense committed.' " Id. at 1137.
310. See, e.g., Franklin v. Shields, 569 F.2d 784, 797 (4th Cir. 1977), aff'd in part and rev'd
in part, 569 F.2d 800 (4th Cir.) (en banc) (per curiam), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1003 (1978); United
States ex rel. Johnson v. Chairman of N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, 500 F.2d 925, 934 (2d Cir.),
vacated as moot sub nom. Regan v. Johnson, 419 U.S. 1015 (1974), overruled, Boothe v.
Hammock, 605 F.2d 661, 664 (2d Cir. 1979). A reasonably detailed written statement of reasons
has often been judged sufficient for due process and statutory requirements. Shahid v. Crawford,
599 F.2d 666, 671-72 (5th Cir. 1979); Fronczak v. Warden, 553 F.2d 1219, 1221 (10th Cir. 1977);
Hill v. Attorney Gen., 550 F.2d 901, 902 (3d Cir. 1977) (per curiam); McGee v. Aaron, 523 F.2d
825, 827 (7th Cir. 1975); deVyver v. Warden, 388 F. Supp. 1213, 1218-20 (M.D. Pa. 1974). In
Hill, the following statement was judged sufficient: " 'Your offense behavior has been rated as
greatest severity because dangerous explosives were employed to seriously and permanently
damage an individual. . . . You have been in custody a total of 10 months. Guidelines ...
indicate a range of 36 or more months to be served before release for cases with good institutional
program performance and adjustment. After careful consideration of all relevant factors and
information presented, it is found that a decision outside the guidelines at this consideration does
not appear warranted. . . .Therefore, the decision in your case has been based In part upon a
comparison of the relative severity of your offense behavior with offense behavior listed in tile
very high severity category.' " 550 F.2d at 902; see Robinson v. United States Bd. of Parole, 403
F. Supp. 638, 640 (W.D.N.Y. 1975) (severity rating must be justified by the reasons offered for
the denial of parole).
311. Johnson, Federal Parole Procedures, 25 Ad. L. Rev. 459, 485 (1973).
312. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 565 (1974); Dumschat v. Board of Pardons, 593 F.2d
165, 166 (2d Cir.), vacated and remanded, 442 U.S. 926 (1979), aff'd and remanded, Nos.
78-2124, -2125 (2d Cir. Mar. 20, 1980).
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statement, for it becomes a basis for a court to decide whether the decision
followed the guidelines of established criteria and whether it was based on
valid and relevant evidence. 31 3 As these documents are compiled, a pattern
should develop; the written statement will either promote consistency of
decision or will supply evidence of the board's arbitrariness. 31 4 The written
statement, therefore, becomes the correctional board's conscience.
Furthermore, the rehabilitative strategy is greatly enhanced by the written
statement. The statement, as a demonstration of a fairly reached decision,
evidences respect for the prisoners' dignity, and may therefore relieve inmate
frustration. 31 5 Especially in the area of parole release, the statement can show
the prisoner his own weaknesses as a parole candidate, either as an internal
disciplinary problem or as a probable failure as a parolee, 31 6 thereby allowing
the prisoner to take action in self-improvement. Moreover, the inmate is
presented with documentary evidence to present in any subsequent proceed-
ing in which he may become involved. 3 7
In Greenholtz, the Court refused to accept this procedure as part of the due
process to which parolees are entitled because it would convert the hearing
into an adversarial proceeding by the issuance of a guilt determination. 31"
Although the court had previously been concerned, in Morrissey v. Brewer3t 9
and Wolff v. McDonnell,320 with prison proceedings becoming full-fledged
criminal trials, 32' the argument opposing written statements never arose, even
though it might appear applicable in either a revocation or disciplinary
hearing. In Greenholtz, the Court was merely concerned with the satisfaction
of limited statutory requirements. 322 Obviously, the Greenholtz reasoning
should carry no weight because its concern is form rather than substance,
thereby ignoring the value of the written statement.
This procedure contains an administrative value because it would impose
no additional burden on the system. The federal government and a majority
of the states have voluntarily adopted the issuance of written statements 323
313. Franklin v. Shields, 569 F.2d 784, 797 (4th Cir. 1977), aff'd in part and rev'd in part,
569 F.2d 800 (4th Cir.) (en banc) (per curiam), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1003 (1978); United States
ex rel. Johnson v. Chairman of N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, 500 F.2d 925, 929 (2d Cir.), vacated as
moot sub nom. Regan v. Johnson, 419 U.S. 1015 (1974), overruled, Boothe v. Hammock, 605
F.2d 661, 664 (2d Cir. 1979).
314. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 40 (1979)
(Marshall, J., dissenting in part); Friendly, supra note 54, at 1292.
315. See Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 40 (1979)
(Marshall, J., dissenting in part); Childs v. United States Bd. of Parole, 511 F.2d 1270, 1282
(D.C. Cir. 1974).
316. United States ex rel. Johnson v. Chairman of N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, 500 F.2d 925,
932 (2d Cir.), vacated as moot sub nora. Regan v. Johnson, 419 U.S. 1015 (1974), overruled,
Boothe v. Hammock, 605 F.2d 661, 664 (2d Cir. 1979).
317. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 565 (1974).
318. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1979).
319. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
320. 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
321. See notes 275-78 supra and accompanying text.
322. 442 U.S. at 11-16.
323. V. O'Leary & K. Hanrahan, Parole Systems in the United States 41 (3d ed. 1976); see,
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because the cost is minimal when weighed against its benefits. 324 Moreover,
the written statement poses no threat to a prison's internal security. 325 To
maintain the needed flexibility, however, an exception has been made. If, in
the discretion of the board, divulgence of a reason would create a risk to the
prison's security or an inmate's safety, the reason may properly be ex-
cluded. 326 When such discretion is exercised, the written statement should
properly indicate the omission.
327
B. When More Process is Due
Additional procedures may be available to the inmate under the intrinsic
approach only if a significant benefit accrues to the rehabilitative process. The
Supreme Court has generally excluded both the right to counsel and the right
to confrontation from prison proceedings. 328 The intrinsic approach would
require either limited forms of these rights or reasonable alternatives.
1. Right to Counsel
In Gagnon v. Scarpelli,329 the Supreme Court held that a parolee or
probationer received a conditional right to counsel only if he had a colorable
claim of innocence, a colorable claim of mitigation, or the incapacity to take
advantage of the opportunity to be heard.330 Although prison authorities
retained the power to refuse to allow the presence of an attorney, the Court
required that the exercise of this discretion must be explained in the record. 33'
Such a refusal then becomes subject to judicial review. 332
The Court has not been so willing, however, to grant a prisoner's request
for counsel. Inmates have been denied the presence of counsel during disci-
e.g., 28 C.F.R. § 2.13(c) (1979); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 947.174(6)(a) (West Supp. 1978); 111. Ann. Stat.
ch. 38, § 1003-3-5(f) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979); Md. Ann. Code art. 41, § 114d(3) (1957/1978);
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 30:4-123.19 (West 1964); N.Y. Exec. Law § 259-i(2)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1979).
But see S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 24-13-7 (1979).
324. Franklin v. Shields, 569 F.2d 784, 797 (4th Cir. 1977), aff'd in part and rev'd in part,
569 F.2d 800 (4th Cir.) (en banc) (per curiam), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1003 (1978).
325. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 565 (1974).
326. Id.
327. Id.
328. Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 315, 321-22 (1976) (access to counsel and right to
cross-examine witnesses are not mandatory requirements of due process inside prison walls);
Wofff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 567, 570 (1974) (same). But see Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S.
778, 790-91 (1973) (conditional right to counsel is permitted for probationers and parolees);
Morrissey v. Brewer. 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972) (parolee has the right of confrontation In
revocation hearings, subject to the discretion of the parole board).
329. 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
330. Id. at 790-91. An additional exception has been created to the general rule of not
allowing counsel to be present at a prison hearing. If the prisoner is being transferred because of
an alleged mental illness, counsel is permitted at the transfer hearing because of the great need of
the mentally ill inmate for legal assistance. Vitek v. Jones, 48 U.S.L.W. 4317, 4322 (U.S. Mar.
25, 1980) (No. 78-1155). Under the intrinsic approach, it may be possible to extend this exception
to all prison proceedings. See note 99 supra.
331. 411 U.S. at 791.




plinary hearings on the ground that the intrusion of counsel would harm the
rehabilitative strategy. 333 Arguably, the introduction of counsel would create
an adversarial system that the Court wishes to avoid. 334 Present correctional
proceedings have the purpose of ascertaining the truth; attorneys have the
purpose of advancing their client's causes. The two functions are not always
compatible. Unreasonable delays in processing cases may arise from the
recognition of a mandatory right of counsel 33s because while most prisons are
in rural settings, attorneys work in urban centers. 336 Moreover, attorneys
would be unnecessary due to the relaxed evidentiary rules in prison hear-
ings. 337
One reasonable alternative is the counsel substitute who becomes available
if the inmate is illiterate or if the complexity of the factual issues makes
prisoner comprehension unlikely. 338 Suggested counsel substitutes include
prison staff members 339 and "jailhouse lawyers, ' 340 whose function would be
to help collect and present evidence to maximize the prisoner's opportunity to
be heard. 341 The use of counsel substitutes, especially jailhouse lawyers,
would be encouraged by the intrinsic approach and would assist the re-
habilitative strategy by respecting the dignity of the inmate involved. 342
Moreover, a valid argument exists for a wholesale adoption of the Gagnon
criteria inside prison walls by using counsel substitutes. If a claim of inno-
cence or mitigation is colorable, 343 the use of a jailhouse lawyer would only
increase the amount of information before the board without increasing the
administrative burdens that would result from the presence of an attorney.
The proceeding would remain primarily fact-finding in nature because the
333. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 569-70 (1974) (quoting Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S.
778, 787-88 (1973)).
334. Id. at 570; Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 787-88 (1973); Friendly, supra note S4, at
1290.
335. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 570 (1974); see Meyers v. Alldredge, 492 F 2d 296,
309 (3d Cir. 1974); G. Alpert, supra note 182, at 136.
336. See T. Wicker, supra note 17, at 34; cf. S. Rep. No. 96-416, supra note 99, at 19-20
(intrusion of federal government into state-run prison systems is necessary because few private
attorneys will accept the burdens involved in representing the institutionalized).
337. Meyers v. Alldredge, 492 F.2d 296, 308 (3d Cir. 1974).
338. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 570 (1974).
339. Staff members would include, for example, "caseworkers at federal institutions [whol are
expected to assist offenders." Bureau of Prisons, Policy Statement No. 7500.14A, at 4 (Jan. 7,
1970).
340. The language of TVolff does not exclude such other substitutes as interns and paralegals,
418 U.S. at 570, but the same problems of availability and access would remain. Conversely, the
Supreme Court approved the use of "jailhouse lawyers" in Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S, 483, 490
(1969). A jailhouse lawyer has been defined as "any prisoner who provides legal assistance to
another prisoner or who files legal papers in his own behalf." G. Alpert, supra note 182, at 4.
Professor Alpert has suggested that prisoner involvement can be effective and useful. Id. at 8.
341. See 28 C.F.R. § 2.13(b) (1979) ("The function of the prisoner's representative shall be to
offer a statement at the conclusion of the interview of the prisoner by the examiner panel, and to
provide such additional information as the examiner panel shall request.').
342. See note 100 supra.




determination to provide the substitute has its origins in the factual question.
Although the prisoner involved in the disciplinary hearing could qualify in
any of the Gagnon circumstances, the potential parolee could qualify only in
the limited circumstances presented by Wolff. 34 4 Thus, the intrinsic approach
provides an alternative right to counsel for prisoners.
2. The Right to Confrontation
The right to confrontation and cross-examination of adverse witnesses has
been limited to revocation hearings, 345 with the qualification that a finding of
good cause by the hearing officer can preempt the right. 346 An exercise of the
good cause power is subject to judicial review. 347
The Supreme Court believes that good cause always exists inside prison
walls. 348 The right to confrontation might create a hazard to institutional and
rehabilitative interests. "Retaliation is much more than a theoretical possibil-
ity; and the basic and unavoidable task of providing reasonable personal
safety for guards and inmates may be at stake, to say nothing of the impact...
on the important aims of the correctional process. '349 Participation in the
hearing process would therefore frustrate the goal of rehabilitation by creating
a security threat and would defeat the intrinsic approach, The opportunity to
be heard sufficiently satisfieg the requirement of the intrinsic approach that
the inmate participate in the rehabilitative process.3 - 0 The predominant effect
of recognizing a right to confrontation in these circumstances would be to
convert the hearing into an adversarial proceeding. 351 One district court has
suggested the use of an oath to replace the right to confrontation, noting
positive effects from an oath requirement, such as the threat of legal sanction
for the making of knowingly false statements, and the solemn nature of the
swearing process. 3
52
In his dissent in Wolff v. McDonnell,353 Justice Douglas fashioned a
reasonable exception to the denial of mandatory confrontation rights. He
344. See note 33S supra and accompanying text.
345. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 786 (1973); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489
(1972).
346. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972). Good cause has been defined as "a
specific finding that, if disclosed, the witness would be subject to risk of harm." Galante v.
United States Parole Comm'n, 466 F. Supp. 1266, 1269 n.6 (D. Conn. 1979); see Birzon v. King,
469 F.2d 1241, 1244-45 (2d Cir. 1972).
347. See Galante v. United States Parole Comm'n, 466 F. Supp. 1266, 1270 (D. Conn. 1979).
See also Birzon v. King, 469 F.2d 1241, 1244 (2d Cir. 1972).
348. Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 321-22 (1976); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539,
567-68 (1974). In Baxter, the Supreme Court refused to allow a prisoner to have either the right to
counsel or the right to confrontation, even though the subject of the disciplinary hearing was a
crime for which he could be tried. 425 U.S. at 315.
349. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 562 (1974). Granting the right to confrontation
would also inhibit other prisoners from furnishing information, thereby restricting the flow of
information that allows prison authorities to maintain discipline efficiently. Id. at 568.
350. Meyers v. Alldredge, 492 F.2d 296, 308 (3d Cir. 1974).
351. Franklin v. Shields, 569 F.2d 784, 796 (4th Cir. 1977), aff'd in part and rev'd in part,
569 F.2d 800 (4th Cir.) (en banc) (per curiam), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1003 (1978).
352. Nimmo v. Simpson, 370 F. Supp. 103, 106 (E.D. Va. 1974).
353. 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
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analogized this denial to cases in which the government is heavily reliant on
informants. 35 4 If the government's only evidence at a prison proceeding is the
testimony of an informer, the government must decide whether to use the
testimony or to grant cross-examination. 35s This exception provides enough
flexibility to enable prison authorities to decide whether to proceed with the
investigation and to protect the individual prisoner from unwarranted charges
of his fellow inmates. 35 6 The proper grant of discretion, coupled with the oath
requirement and the informer exception, satisfies the intrinsic approach to due
process by protecting all the parties involved.
CONCLUSION
If the rehabilitative process is to be truly effective, the policies underlying
the method of revoking participation in beneficial programs, as well as
denying access to them, must be consistent with the rationale for creating the
programs and encouraging their use. An accord between prison practices and
the expressed goal of rehabilitation can be realized by the adoption of the
intrinsic approach to due process. The minimum procedures of the intrinsic
approach, which are measured by their assistance to the rehabilitative strat-
egy, facilitate the attainment of this accord. Only a uniform application of
constitutional guarantees can consistently provide respect to the human
dignity of prisoners, which is always an extremely valuable interest.
Joseph Guglielmelli
354. Id. at 600 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part). The government's privilege to preserve the
anonymity of an informer is rooted in the policy of encouraging citizens to reveal any information
they possess about a crime. Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 59 (1957). The Supreme Court
has held, however, that this privilege is qualified if the defendant establishes that he will be
denied his sixth amendment right to a fair trial unless he is allowed to confront the informer Id.
at 60-61. The qualification may be invoked in situations in which "the disclosure of an informer's
identity, or of the contents of his communication, is relevant and helpful to the defense of an
accused, or is essential to a fair determination of a cause." Id. To challenge the privilege
successfully, the need for the informer's identity must have a strong factual basis See id. at 64-65.
The applicability of the Roviaro test had been limited to criminal trials in which guilt or
innocence is determined. McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 309 (1967). Further expansion has
occurred, however, whereby the test is applicable to all litigation in which ultimate liability is
decided. Hampton v. Hanrahan, 600 F.2d 600, 637 & n.40 (7th Cir. 1979), petition for cert filed,
48 U.S.L.W. 3414 (U.S. Dec. 11, 1979) (No. 79-912); In re United States. 565 F 2d 19. 22-23 (Zd
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 962 (1978). The Rotiaro test has been used in prison
proceedings. Carver v. England, 470 F. Supp. 900, 901 (E.D. Tenn. 1978) (mem ), off'd, 599
F.2d 1055 (6th Cir. 1979). In Carver, the petitioner asserted that he was denied his sixth
amendment rights because the identity of an informer was not revealed at his probation hearing.
470 F. Supp. at 901. The district court held that disclosure of the informer's identity was not
helpful or necessary because his identity was a peripheral tissue in the case and the petitioner's
assertion of need was based on conjecture as to the role of the informer in causing probation to be
revoked. Id. at 902-03. The Douglas exception calls for the use of the Roviaro test behind prison
walls when the informer's identity and information is the sole source of government action This
single piece of evidence may become central to just determination of an action 4 18 U S at 600
(Douglas, J., dissenting in part).
355. 418 U.S. at 600 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part).
356. Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, 73 Mich. L. Rev. 71, 177 (19741
